This page is an evolving compilation of citizen investigation of the highly suspicious New Hampshire primary voting results. We are borrowing and synthesizing from many sources cited and credited here. See links to all additional NH primary articles at foot of this page.
Monday, Jan. 21: Correcting Factual Errors in Salon: "Was the New Hampshire Vote Stolen?"
[1]
by Bruce O'Dell and Theron Horton, Election Defense Alliance
==================
Friday, January 18: See today's EDA Blog [2] entry:
The Outsourced, Unaccountable New Hampshire Election System
[3] and Implications for the Recounts
by Bruce O'Dell, EDA Co-Coordinator for Election Analysis January 16th: In a telephone conversation with Nancy Swett of the New Hampshire Secretary of State’s office at 3:02 p.m. (EST) today, it was confirmed that the required prepayment for the hand-recount of all Democratic Party ballots cast has been received. Status regarding the receipt for the prepayment of the Republican recount remains unclear at this time. Those who would like to express appreciation to the Kucinich campaign for taking this stand for national election integrity may read more here:
==================
RECOUNTS of all Democratic and Republican ballots cast in the New Hampshire primary are underway.
Kucinich Campaign Files and Pays for Recount of NH Democratic Primary [4]
CORRECTED Statewide New Hampshire 2008 Democratic Primary Analysis
See CORRECTION Note further below (jump link: Read More)
Clinton: statewide optical scan tally
95,843
52.73%
Obama: statewide optical scan tally
85,910
47.27%
Clinton: statewide hand-count tally
16,767
46.75%
Obama: hand count
19,097
53.25%
While the actual difference between Obama and Clinton hand count and optical scan margins are not a mirror image of each other to four decimal places as we had initially believed*, the undeniable fact that Obama appears to have carried the hand-counted tally statewide, while Clinton carried the optical scan statewide tally -- by almost exactly opposite margins -- remains a remarkable result.
* See Correction Note below for full explanation of originally posted information.
Overview of NH Polling and Vote Count Discrepancies
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/overview_NH_discrepancies [5]
Table of Machine vs. Hand Count Differentials (Democratic Primary)
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/machine_vs_paper_count_differenti... [6]
"I Count" Volunteer Signup to Hand Count Paper Ballots
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/register_i_count_corps_hand_count... [7]
NH Primary Voting Data Spreadsheets -- EDA
2008NHDemPrimComplete-EDA.xls [8] (Democratic) and
2008NHRepPrimComplete-EDA.xls [9] (Republican)
New Hampshire Binomial Statistics
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/New_Hampshire_Binomial_Statistics [10]
On January 10, 2008, analysts at the Election Defense Alliance (EDA) reported that, based on the official results on the New Hampshire Secretary of state web site, there was a remarkable relationship between Obama and Clinton votes, comparing votes tabulated by op-scan to votes tabulated by hand in a head-to-head contest between the two candidates:
Clinton: statewide optical scan tally
91,717
52.95%
Obama: statewide optical scan tally
81,495
47.05%
Clinton: statewide hand-count tally
20,889
47.05%
Obama: hand count
23,509
52.95%
EDA subsequently learned that the list of New Hampshire hand-count voting districts used in our initial analysis on January 10, 2008 was outdated information. Shortly after that list was downloaded the New Hampshire Secretary of State published a corrected list showing 14 districts previously listed as hand-count, as having in fact been counted by Diebold optical scan.[1]
====================
[1] -- Voting method information was downloaded November 22, 2007 but was subsequently updated November 26, 2007.
The 14 locations that the state of New Hampshire had previously listed as hand-counted but that are actually optical scan, are:
Carroll County -- Moultonborough, Ossipee, Tamworth
Cheshire County -- Fitzwilliam
Grafton County -- Campton, Plymouth
Hillsborough County -- Hillsborough, New Boston
Merrimack County -- Newbury
Rockingham County -- East Kingston
Strafford County -- New Durham
Sullivan County -- Claremont Wards 1, 2 and 3
The net effect was to reduce the hand-count vote and increase the optical scan vote in each county.
[2] -- See Real Clear Politics [11] (below) for a summary of 7 pre-election public tracking polls from 1/5 to 1/7/08, showing Obama in the lead at 38.3%, with Clinton trailing 8 points at 30.0%.
Head to head percentages were calculated as: Clinton = 30/(30+38.3) and Obama= 38.2/(30+38.3)
Average of Seven Pre-Election Polls
Clinton 43.9%
Obama 56.1%
Whenever the outcome of an election is strongly correlated with the method of voting – given the well-known vulnerabilities of the specific model of Diebold equipment in use – additional investigation is warranted. This is especially urgent when the margin between two candidates for ballots counted by hand conforms to the margin between two candidates reflected in hand-count optical scan vote is so far apart -- and the hand count matches the pre-election polling so precisely. Our analysis has continued, and additional findings will be published separately.
2008NHDemPrimComplete-EDA.xls [8] (Democratic) and
2008NHRepPrimComplete-EDA.xls [9] (Republican)
Spreadsheets Include:
* Official Democratic and Republican primary voting results as reported on the New Hampshire Secretary of State webpage
* Voting equipment type / hand-counted paper ballot indicator for each voting location
* Election 2000 results and 2000 Census demographics, for each voting location.
Other tabs:
* Original voting equipment type and method data courtesy of Blackbox Voting
* Complete set of 2000 election and Census data for all counties
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
| 2008CORRECTEDNHRepPrimComplete-EDA-with anomaly.xls [12] | 820.5 KB |
| 2008CORRECTEDNHDemPrimComplete-EDA-with anomaly.xls [13] | 902.5 KB |
Binomial Analysis of Clinton vs. Obama Contest in New Hampshire:
"The Excel spreadsheet shown below gives the binomial probability that the boundaries of the hand-counted paper ballot (HCPB) and Diebold optical scan precincts should have, by sheer accident, corresponded to parts of New Hampshire that had bizarrely dichotomized into 6% pro-Obama and 6% pro-Clinton enclaves, respectively. That probability (corresponding to 17 standard deviations, or “SDs”) turns out to be so infinitesimally small that I haven’t yet found a look-up table for it. Seventeen SDs is about as close to “statistical impossibility” as one ever gets to see."
See full commentary on hypothesis and method, below chart
As a Ph.D. research physicist for nearly 42 years, I am accustomed to gathering data and then deciding what these data mean. That is, I (and any physicist worth his salt) seek hypotheses suitable for explaining all existing data. Hypothesizing usually begins with an educated guess. But it can never end there. As soon as a guess is on the table, the challenge is to quantify its predictions. And to do that requires mathematics.
Since my retirement from the Naval Research Laboratory seven years ago this month, I have continued to carry out research and publish papers in peer-reviewed journals using data I had gathered at NRL but not yet published, data gathered as a visiting professor somewhere, or data gathered by colleagues still working in well equipped laboratories. It has really been impossible for me to give up the habit of being a physicist.
However, in recent years I have increasingly turned my attentions from physical phenomena to “political” phenomena, including the 9/11 attacks, insider manipulation of the financial markets, and insider-perpetrated election fraud. Once again, educated guesses have been my starting points, but I never stop there. Typically, I gather all data available from public sources and make sure that none of these data contradict the hypothesis I may be hatching. Then it comes time for the mathematics.
With my friend and colleague John Brakey, I have been on the trail of election fraud in Pima County, Arizona, ever since the 2004 election. This has culminated in the chapter I wrote for publication in a book being edited by Mark Crispin Miller entitled Loser Take All (which will also feature chapters by many of my distinguished colleagues from Election Defense Alliance and elsewhere, all of whom exhibit research skills and methodology matching those of any good physicist).
In my paper, I exploit publicly-available data for the 2004 presidential vote at 63 precincts belonging to a single Tucson legislative district. My educated guess, or operating premise, was that on the average the Bush and Kerry vote shares for any given precinct should be closely the same for the three modes of voting used in 2004: mail-in voting, at-the-precinct voting, and voting by provisional ballots. I found this premise to be true within 95% statistical confidence (the math I brought to bear at that point) when comparing the mail-in voting to the provisional ballot voting.
I used data for provisional ballots that were accepted by the county registrar; therefore, the vote shares represented there had to have been honest since the registrar had to verify the name and signature on the affixed voter affidavits and check to see that those persons were voting in the correct precinct and had not voted by mail. Thus, to my surprise, I was force to conclude that the mail-in vote had not been stolen despite the ease with which this could have been done, given that these ballots are counted by Pima Election Department officials without witnesses.
But when I compared the at-the-precinct presidential vote shares to the now-shown-to-be-(mostly)-honest mail-in vote shares for these 63 precincts, I found a large shift favoring Bush that was outside of 95% statistical confidence. Still, the mathematics I was using then were crude – and I wanted to sharpen in my mind the concept that was to become my hypothesis. That is, there certainly must be random variations in people’s choices whether to vote by mail or in person at the precinct. And to prove fraud I must prove that differences in the public record substantially exceed the nominal limits of such random variations.
I realized that such situations are mathematically described by the binomial distribution function. So I searched for and found a handy calculator of this function on the Internet, and did the math. (N.B. This is the same function that gives you your chances of flipping heads x times in n tries.) In this way I proved that there was only one chance in 15,773 that the at-the-precinct vote for the entire legislative district (56,930 Bush-plus-Kerry voters) was not flipped by 3.4% from Kerry to Bush (for a net vote shift of 6.8%).
The New Hampshire primaries were held only two days after I turned in the final version of my chapter to the publisher of Loser Take All. And there staring me in the face were these Clinton-plus-Obama data: Clinton took 46.8% of the hand-counted paper-ballot (HCPB) vote but fully 52.7% of the Diebold optically-scanned vote. Obama was virtually the reverse, taking 53.2% of the HCPBs but only 47.3% of the Diebold vote! Now, just how probable is that? Another job for the binomial distribution function calculator!
I reason that the boundaries of the Diebold op-scan precincts and those of the HCPB precincts had been drawn up years ago, either arbitrarily or with an idea toward somehow giving an advantage to Democratic or Republican candidates (depending on which political party did the deciding). Such a demographic bias, if it even exists, should in my view have little impact on a Democratic primary contest between two Republican-lite candidates. It was inconceivable to me that the distribution of HCPB and Diebold precincts was anything but random with respect to the Clinton-Obama contest. But, hey, why listen to my opinion when the binomial distribution function speaks with far greater authority?
The Excel spreadsheet shown above gives the binomial probability that the HCPB and Diebold precinct boundaries should have, by sheer accident, corresponded to parts of New Hampshire that had bizarrely dichotomized into 6% pro-Obama and 6% pro-Clinton enclaves, respectively.
That probability (corresponding to 17 Standard Deviations, or “SDs”) turns out to be so infinitesimally small that I haven’t yet found a look-up table for it. Seventeen SDs is about as close to “statistical impossibility” as one ever gets to see.
In my humble opinion, this should be sufficient proof that insiders hacked the Diebold GEMS central tabulator for the New Hampshire Democratic primary op-scan ballots. As a corollary, in the event that a recount should show the paper ballots in the Diebold machines to match the GEMS count, then the binomial distribution function would assure us that the ballot boxes had been stuffed as well.
Jan. 22, 2008
by Bruce O’Dell and Theron Horton, Election Defense Alliance
Problems with Manjoo’s Source Data
“The most thorough analysis I've seen was performed by an anonymous supporter of Ron Paul.”
The origin of the http://www.checkthevotes.com [15] site was described by its webmaster as follows:
This site was birthed out of a late night whim to try to see if I could make better sense of the numbers I saw coming in from the New Hampshire primaries. It was originally just an exercise in data formatting, but during the night, with the great help of fellow Ron Paul supporters from http://www.RonPaulForums.com [16], I began to add data points to my charts.[1]
However, this “most thorough analysis,” though well intentioned, was initially based on incorrect data and on ad-hoc statistical categories.
In fact, the webmaster, who has consistently acted responsibly to correct all issues with his new site/project, subsequently removed the voting district size categories that Manjoo used as the basis of his January 11 article. According to a checkthevotes.com screenshot from the evening of January 12:
I have changed the size of the town breakdown because it was brought to my attention by another person offering vote stats that for the hand-counting in large towns, there wasn't enough data for it to be statistically significant.”[2]
Nor did Majoo check his source’s primary data. The official tallies were available on the Official New Hampshire Secretary of State Website on the morning of January 10. Yet as-of 9:18 AM CST on Monday, January 14, 2008, a full six days after the New Hampshire Presidential Primary, checkthevote.com still listed the total vote for Clinton as 112,238 and the total vote for Obama as 104,757, while the New Hampshire Secretary of State website’s official vote total for Clinton was 112,610 and the total vote for Obama is 105,007. Also as of that time, checkthevotes.com had not corrected the voting methods for numerous voting districts.
In paragraph 11 Manjoo, utilizing the checkthevotes.com data, states “in places with more than 1,500 votes, here, Clinton, not Obama, did better in hand-count areas”.
However, there were no hand-counted voting districts that had “more than 1500 votes”. The largest Democratic hand-counted voting district had only 1,172 votes, in Newport in Sullivan County. When we brought this the attention of the author, he indicated that he was referring to “Claremont and Franklin Counties”.
The three voting districts that comprise each of these towns - rather than “counties” - had been consolidated into a single number on the website at the Concord Monitor Online[3]. The consolidation of the voting districts’ vote totals distorted Manjoo’s analysis of the data. But there is a more serious problem with his analysis.
If Majoo truly intended to use Claremont as one of the “places with more than 1,500 votes” to make the assertion that, “Clinton, not Obama, did better in hand-count areas” there is a problem. According to the Official New Hampshire Secretary of State Website, Claremont Wards 1, 2 and 3 are actually not hand-count voting districts; they use Accuvote optical scanners. In fact, the Claremont City Clerk’s Office verified by phone that they Accuvote[4]. Again in this case, Manjoo was using checkthevotes.com as his source. Checkthevotes.com has subsequently acknowledged that the Claremont voting method data that they had originally provided was incorrect.
Additionally, the hand counted paper ballot analysis provided in paragraph 12 states (emphasis from the original document) :
Manjoo: “Let me say that again: In large areas, Clinton did better in places where votes were counted by hand than where votes were counted by machine.”
First, “large areas” is a spurious category; second, there is no apparent factual basis for Manjoo’s statement.
According to the Secretary of State’s original posted data, Clinton won 35.56% of the vote in “the larger hand-count voting districts” (defining those, as voting districts between the maximum size of 1,172 votes and ones half that size, or 550 voters) and Clinton got 41.02% of the vote in the “larger optical scan districts” (defining those as voting districts between the maximum of 5,542 and one half that size, or 2,771 votes). Even if you simply look at the 32 largest hand count v. the 32 largest optical scan voting districts, Clinton’s margin was 35.56% for the 32 largest hand count districts, and 40.85% for the 32 largest optical scan districts.
Finally, paragraph 13 identifies Amherst as a “county”; it is a voting district.
These factual errors should be corrected, and the thesis of the article should be re-examined.
We wish that it was possible to dismiss concerns about the outcome in New Hampshire simply by saying optical scan tallies vary from hand-count results because people who use optical scan equipment are clustered in communities that tend to vote differently. If you accept the basic integrity of the current voting system, that’s a reasonable and comforting position; but assuming the integrity of the vote as a premise of your argument against those impeaching the integrity of the vote is circular reasoning. It is also possible that optical-scan voting districts have different voting patterns than hand-counted paper districts simply because that’s how the equipment says they tend to vote.
There is no certain way to resolve which alternative is correct as long as votes are counted in secret by machine.
That’s why we do agree with Manjoo, when he says that that “…as many voting-reform experts have argued, manually counting the votes should be a routine in any race… we should, at least, conduct a randomized, accountant-approved audit of ballots” - but we would add, only if ballots can one day be handled with the same care – and controls - we apply to cash. You’ll not likely soon see boxes of cash at the corner bank stored in a cardboard boxes secured with stick-on paper seals, and grudgingly brought in to be double-checked weeks after their deposit - only if and when someone else offers to pay for it.
We wish we could share Mebane and Manjoo’s confidence that the host of well-documented computer system and voting procedural vulnerabilities are not being actively exploited, and specifically, their stated faith in the official outcome of the Ohio Presidential election and recount there in 2004. The jailed election officials who gamed the Cuyahoga County recount and their counterparts in the fifty seven Ohio counties that lost or destroyed their 2004 ballot records, despite court orders to preserve them, hardly require “conspiracy theorists” to call attention to their actions.
No one calls an IT auditor at a bank an “embezzlement theorist” when he or she states that security vulnerabilities discovered in accounting procedures or in the bank’s software might actually have been exploited.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] See: http://www.checkthevotes.com/faq [17] (note correction: changed from .../home on 01/23)
[2] See: screenshot of the checkthevotes.com website 1/12/07 10:06 PM CST
[3] http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/files/elections/2008/by_county/NH_Dem_0108.... [18]
[4] Claremont County Clerk’s contact information: VOICE 603.542.7003 • FAX 603.542.7014
UPDATE: WOW!!! Almost 65,000 views from over 33,000 unique visitors in the last 24 hours!!! Keep it up! (01/09/08 11:40PM MST)
With all the activity and stories today, the thousands and thousands of views to this page in the last 12 hours, I wanted to emphasize a few
key points.
First, all of the numbers here are either untouched from the latest polling results or pretty simple calculations using those results.
Second, these results by themselves are NOT enough to prove that any fraud occured. They simply show that some things stand out as being odd
and worthy of further investigation.
Third, my purpose in all of this is to simply bring attention to these apparent anomalies. The anomalies appear in the votes for both parties.
My only agenda is that the voters on both sides be accurately represented.
Last, please be civil and courteous with those whom you discuss these issues. Do not attack, slander, or otherwise disparage anyone until
there has been verified fraud if that happens to be the case. And even in that case, take the high road. Again, all we should be trying to do
is make sure that every vote is accurately reflected and counted.
Switch To Republican Results [20] OR Switch To Democrat Results [19]
Who's Here? [21] |
| Candidate | Total Votes | Avg. Overall | Votesby Machine | Avg. Overallby Machine | Votesby Hand | Avg. Overallby Hand | Machine VS Hand | Votesby Unknown** | Avg. Overallby Unknown |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton | 112,166 | 39.003% | 91,600 | 40.121% | 20,529 | 34.703% | 5.419% (15,584 votes*) | 37 | 31.897% |
| Edwards | 48,618 | 16.906% | 38,210 | 16.736% | 10,402 | 17.584% | -0.847% (-2,437 votes*) | 6 | 5.172% |
| Gravel | 402 | 0.140% | 317 | 0.139% | 85 | 0.144% | -0.005% (-14 votes*) | 0 | 0.000% |
| Kucinich | 3,893 | 1.354% | 2,801 | 1.227% | 1,090 | 1.843% | -0.616% (-1,771 votes*) | 2 | 1.724% |
| Obama | 104,639 | 36.386% | 81,633 | 35.756% | 22,944 | 38.785% | -3.029% (-8,711 votes*) | 62 | 53.448% |
| Richardson | 13,235 | 4.602% | 9,936 | 4.352% | 3,290 | 5.561% | -1.209% (-3,478 votes*) | 9 | 7.759% |
| Other | 4,627 | 1.609% | 3,810 | 1.669% | 817 | 1.381% | 0.288% (827 votes*) | 0 | 0.000% |
| TOTALS: | 287,580 | 228,307 | 59,157 | 116 |
*Votes are tentatively won or lost with the assumption that the machines are conferring advantages or disadvantages.
**Unknown towns (where the data doesn't specify counting method) include: Harts Location, Waterville, Wentworth's Location
| Candidate | VotesSmall Towns | Avg. OverallSmall Towns | VotesSmall Townsby Machine | Avg. OverallSmall Townsby Machine | VotesSmall Townsby Hand | Avg. OverallSmall Townsby Hand | Machine VS Handin Small Towns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton | 14,753 | 34.132% | 2,167 | 37.369% | 12,549 | 33.635% | 3.733% |
| Edwards | 7,609 | 17.604% | 1,077 | 18.572% | 6,526 | 17.492% | 1.080% |
| Gravel | 69 | 0.160% | 10 | 0.172% | 59 | 0.158% | 0.014% |
| Kucinich | 754 | 1.744% | 65 | 1.121% | 687 | 1.841% | -0.720% |
| Obama | 16,865 | 39.018% | 2,032 | 35.041% | 14,771 | 39.591% | -4.550% |
| Richardson | 2,489 | 5.758% | 339 | 5.846% | 2,141 | 5.739% | 0.107% |
| Other | 685 | 1.585% | 109 | 1.880% | 576 | 1.544% | 0.336% |
| TOTALS: | 43,224 | 5,799 | 37,309 |
| Candidate | VotesMedium Towns | Avg. OverallMedium Towns | VotesMedium Townsby Machine | Avg. OverallMedium Townsby Machine | VotesMedium Townsby Hand | Avg. OverallMedium Townsby Hand | Machine VS Handin Medium Towns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton | 23,133 | 38.600% | 17,044 | 40.233% | 6,089 | 34.662% | 5.572% |
| Edwards | 10,805 | 18.029% | 7,706 | 18.190% | 3,099 | 17.641% | 0.549% |
| Gravel | 77 | 0.128% | 55 | 0.130% | 22 | 0.125% | 0.005% |
| Kucinich | 823 | 1.373% | 453 | 1.069% | 370 | 2.106% | -1.037% |
| Obama | 21,463 | 35.813% | 14,643 | 34.566% | 6,820 | 38.823% | -4.257% |
| Richardson | 2,847 | 4.751% | 1,853 | 4.374% | 994 | 5.658% | -1.284% |
| Other | 782 | 1.305% | 609 | 1.438% | 173 | 0.985% | 0.453% |
| TOTALS: | 59,930 | 42,363 | 17,567 |
| Candidate | VotesLarge Towns | Avg. OverallLarge Towns | VotesLarge Townsby Machine | Avg. OverallLarge Townsby Machine | VotesLarge Townsby Hand | Avg. OverallLarge Townsby Hand | Machine VS Handin Large Towns |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Clinton | 74,280 | 40.276% | 72,389 | 40.184% | 1,891 | 44.172% | -3.988% |
| Edwards | 30,204 | 16.377% | 29,427 | 16.335% | 777 | 18.150% | -1.815% |
| Gravel | 256 | 0.139% | 252 | 0.140% | 4 | 0.093% | 0.046% |
| Kucinich | 2,316 | 1.256% | 2,283 | 1.267% | 33 | 0.771% | 0.496% |
| Obama | 66,311 | 35.955% | 64,958 | 36.059% | 1,353 | 31.605% | 4.454% |
| Richardson | 7,899 | 4.283% | 7,744 | 4.299% | 155 | 3.621% | 0.678% |
| Other | 3,160 | 1.713% | 3,092 | 1.716% | 68 | 1.588% | 0.128% |
| TOTALS: | 184,426 | 180,145 | 4,281 |
Original source: Notes from Underground blog [22], Mark Crispin Miller
Where Paper Prevailed, Different Results By Lori Price 09 Jan 2008
http://www.legitgov.org/nh_machine_vs_paper.html [23]
2008 New Hampshire Democratic Primary Results
http://ronrox.com/paulstats.php?party=DEMOCRATS [19] --Total Democratic
Votes: 286,139 - Machine vs Hand (RonRox.com) 09 Jan 2008
Hillary Clinton, Diebold Accuvote optical scan: 39.618%
Clinton, Hand Counted Paper Ballots: 34.908%
Barack Obama, Diebold Accuvote optical scan: 36.309%
Obama, Hand Counted Paper Ballots: 38.617%
Machine vs Hand:
Clinton: 4.709%* (13,475 votes)
Obama: *-2.308%* (-6,604 votes)
=======================
2008 New Hampshire Republican Primary Results
http://ronrox.com/paulstats.php?party=REPUBLICANS [20] --Total
Republican Votes: 236,378 Machine vs Hand (RonRox.com) 09 Jan 2008
Mitt Romney, Diebold Accuvote optical scan: 33.075%
Romney, Hand Counted Paper Ballots: 25.483%
Ron Paul, Diebold Accuvote optical scan: 7.109%
Paul, Hand Counted Paper Ballots: 9.221%
Machine vs Hand:
Romney: 7.592% (17,946 votes)
Paul: -2.112% (-4,991 votes)
------------------------
NH: "First in the nation" (with corporate controlled secret vote counting)
By Nancy Tobi 07 Jan 2008
http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/5307 [24]
81% of New Hampshire ballots are counted in secret by a private corporation named Diebold Election Systems (now known as "Premier").
The elections run on these machines are programmed by one company, LHS Associates, based in Methuen, MA.
We know nothing about the people programming these machines, and we know even less about LHS Associates.
We know even less about the secret vote counting software used to tabulate 81% of our ballots.
See also CLG
GOP Candidate Albert Howard Files Recount Appeal with NH Ballot Law Commission
Petition of Appeal, noted violations, and weaknesses in NH recount cited below
Petition of Appeal to the Ballot Law Commission
c/o Office of the Secretary of State, William Gardner
State House
Concord, New Hampshire 03301
by Albert Howard, Republican candidate for President of the United States
New Hampshire Primary Election of January 8th, 2008
Date: February 15, 2008
Petitioner: Albert Howard, Pro Se 710 Apple St. Ann Arbor, MI 48105-1750
Subject of Petition: Appeal of results of the Presidential Primary recount completed February 11, 2008; examination of contested ballots in that recount.
Relief Requested: That the Ballot Law Commission and the Secretary of State’s office disclaim any opinion on the accuracy of the Presidential primary election AND the statewide Republican recount because checks and balances to maintain the integrity of the ballots and the total counts were either not followed, or not in place.
Introduction:
New Hampshire has the distinct honor of having the first Presidential primary in the country and has always been viewed as a model state because of its election system and methodology of holding elections in an open, transparent fashion. I, for one, thank you for keeping the tradition of being one of the few states in the country that still has a paper ballot for every person who votes. Your standards for transparency and support of the democratic process are admirable and much appreciated.
I ask that you view the following petition as an opportunity to improve your procedures and policies. The scrutiny of election observers has brought with it a chance to correct areas of vulnerabilities and potential breakdowns and holes in the system. As a candidate I am requesting you work with me and together we can open up meaningful dialogue to bring better procedures and amend areas that need attention based on my experience and in consultation with many experienced and dedicated election integrity advocates.
If this Commission chooses to follow through and act on my questions, requests and recommendations, I am certain it will make New Hampshire’s electoral system even stronger and an even better leader for other states to follow.
This Petition is not about me. This Petition represents the requests of the people this Ballot Law Commission represents. Every person who voted in this Primary election wants to know that their vote was accepted and counted as cast. They want to have no doubt about the integrity of New Hampshire’s election process.
I am asking for the opportunity to work with you, to initiate an open, meaningful dialogue regarding how we can bring further reform to an already good system. My goal is to walk away from this process with both sides feeling that meaningful agreement was reached for all parties. and that together we have identified and addressed the few weak spots.
New Hampshire has a long and proud election tradition. Transparency is a key component of this tradition and the remedy suggestions included in this Petition are intended to enhance that tradition.
PETITION:
Petitioner contends that the results of the statewide Republican recount are potentially invalid due to violation of various state election laws, procedures of the Ballot Law Commission, and written procedures governing the handling and securing of the ballots. Furthermore, discrepancies shown between the results of those ballots counted by hand versus those counted by Diebold optical scan counters (see Appendix 1), together with violations of HAVA requirements, indicate a high risk and opportunity for manipulation of ballots and vote totals, thereby invalidating the results of both the Primary election and the recount.
Examples of violations of statutes or procedures follows. The sequence, in accordance with that outlined in the statutes of the Ballot Law Commission, will be the violation, the remedy requested, and the citation of the appropriate statutes or regulations. Exhibits illustrating most of the violations will follow.
VIOLATION #1: Machine failures were handled improperly -- and possibly altered the outcome of the election.
Fact: Election Day problems with the Diebold Optical Scan machines clearly demonstrated that many of the machines malfunctioned during the Primary election. Do we have any way of knowing that the new memory cards had been examined and approved by the Ballot Law Commission (BLC) as required? Did local election officials allow illegal substitution of election devices that had not been examined and certified? Shouldn’t these machines have been declared unfit for service as dictated by state law?
Town clerks have told Dori Smith, a journalist from Connecticut, that memory cards were “switched out” in some towns by LHS employees, counter to state election laws, calling into question the chain of custody of these critical “electronic ballot boxes”.
Secretary of States MANUAL P. 34-35: The seal for the memory card should be replaced for each election when the newly programmed card is re-inserted into the machine for the pre-election testing of the card. The card should remain sealed until after the recount period ends following the election. The seal for the cover of the machine should only be broken by LHS when it services the machine. The cover must be resealed by the clerk when the LHS technician has completed any service work. Each time any of the two seals are broken and the machine is resealed it should be documented in the log.
Exhibit A documents the reports by LHS of (at least some of) the day’s problems. A few examples are included below from reports received by LHS and forwarded to the Secretary of State’s office.
Town of Manchester, two examples:
“solution listed (What happened here? This was the 3rd machine to be replaced that day in this location.)
Problem: P/U 3rd bad machine per John S.”
“Problem: Machine taking ballots but counter not incrementing
Solution: Swap to spare machine to reburn a new card.”
(What happened to the votes on the first machine and first memory card?
Does “reburn a new card” mean the memory card could have been illegally reprogrammed?)
Town of Barnstead:
“Problem: Ballots rejecting a lot, even during test. They did not call (?)
Solution: Told them I would have someone bring a new machine. They said no – It was working”
(What really happened here? Improper testing or a machine failing a test should have disqualified the machine from usage in an election. State statute VI. cites as a misdemeanor violation a person knowingly violating testing procedures and/or ignoring a machine failing testing.)
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: Some states have approved their equipment conditionally, so that investigations such as this would be paid by the vendor, in this case Diebold. As well, the New Hampshire statutes could be tightened so that, just as LHS must bear the cost of an invalid recount due to an employee’s failure to properly program and test LHS’ machines (RSA 656:42: V), LHS could as well be obliged to reimburse all costs related to investigation of their procedures. In the case of this Violation, it would mean that they would bear responsibility for investigating the accountability for every memory card
Their records and their doors must also be open to you for all testing, all maintenance, programming, bookkeeping, etc. The State, perhaps the Office of the Secretary of State or the BLC with the addition of a few citizen election activists should be welcome at all times to review/witness their work, their procedures, their books, etc.
An inquiry should be undertaken immediately for accountability of each memory card used in the Primary election, as well as the whereabouts and the sequence of events surrounding all memory cards used, including all delivered cards, all cards found to be problematic on Election Day, any substitute cards, “reburned” cards, and any unused cards delivered to the jurisdictions. Results of inquiry to be delivered to Petitioner.
I, as Petitioner, pursuant to RSA 656:42, request the opportunity to inspect the offices of LHS along with at least two computer technical experts of my choosing. (RSA 656:42, Section IV: Each person described in paragraph III shall designate, in writing, an agent for service of all process, including, but not limited to summonses, writs, orders, petitions, and subpoenas, and shall agree in writing that the Attorney General, in conjunction with any election investigation, may inspect its records, machines or other devices, and premises.)
I also request a full report of every visit by an LHS-related technician to a jurisdiction on January 8th, 2008 and ask that this report be compiled and examined as part of this inquiry. In the meantime, we are requesting that the Secretary of State consider sending out an order that all voting machines used in the State be impounded and vote totals NOT BE CLEARED until this formal inquiry is completed. I further request that no ballots or other election materials be destroyed prior to the 22 month waiting period as mandated by federal law. Several of the boxes of ballots received at the State Archive Building for the recount were marked: “Destroy November 2009” and these must be corrected to “2010.” See Exhibit A.
CITATIONS:
656:41 Approval by Ballot Law Commission. The Ballot Law Commission shall act as a board to examine voting machines and devices for computerized casting and counting of ballots. … Any voting machine or device that is altered must be re-approved before it is used in any election in this state. For the purposes of this section, a machine shall be considered altered if any mechanical or electronic part, hardware, software, or programming has been altered.
RSA 656:42 III. Any company, partnership, proprietorship, or other person, wherever located, which supplies, maintains, or programs voting machines which are used in elections in New Hampshire is subject to regulation by this state. (The following amendment to RSA 659:42 will take effect January 1, 2007)
RSA 659:42 Tampering with Voting Machines. Whoever shall tamper with or injure or attempt to injure any voting machine or device for the computerized casting and counting of ballots to be used or being used in an election or whoever shall prevent or attempt to prevent the correct operation of such machine or device or whoever shall tamper with software used in the casting or counting of ballots or design such software so as to cause incorrect tabulation of the ballots or any unauthorized person who shall make or have in his or her possession a key to a voting machine to be used or being used in an election shall be guilty of a class B felony if a natural person or guilty of a felony if any other person.
Secretary of State Manual page 34 - 35: The seal for the memory card should be replaced for each election when the newly programmed card is re-inserted into the machine for the pre-election testing of the card. The card should remain sealed until after the recount period ends following the election. The seal for the cover of the machine should only be broken by LHS when it services the machine. The cover must be resealed by the clerk when the LHS technician has completed any service work. Each time any of the two seals are broken and the machine is resealed it should be documented in the appropriate log.
Bal 604.02 Zeroing and Sealing Machines. (b) When a voting machine or device has been prepared for election, it shall be locked against voting and sealed and the keys shall be retained by the designated election officials. After the voting machine has been transferred to the polling place, it shall be the duty of the designated election official to provide protection against molestation, tampering or injury to the machines or devices.
Bal 606.04 Damaged Machines. In the event that any voting machine or device used i n any voting district during the time the polls are open, become damaged or disabled so as to render it inoperative in whole or in part, the election officials shall forthwith if possible, substitute a perfect machine for the damaged one. At the close of the polls, the votes shown on the counters of each machine shall be added together in ascertaining the results of the election. In the event that no other machine can be prepared forthwith for use at such election and the damaged one cannot be repaired in time, the provisions of RSA 658:35 shall apply.
VIOLATION # 2: Machine failures render equipment non-compliant with HAVA regulations.
Fact: HAVA requires that the error rate of machines used be no greater than one error in 500,000 ballot positions. In one of the most recent tests, at the University of Connecticut, the Diebold Precinct-Based Optical Scan Accuvote 1.94W system (AV OS), demonstrated a failure rate of roughly 3.4 %. This puts New Hampshire in an unfortunate situation and the integrity of its election results in question. I urge the Ballot Law Commission and the Secretary of State’s office to seriously consider restoring elections utilizing 100% hand counted paper ballots. The fundamentals are in place for a meaningful and transparent election. The Diebold Optical Scan equipment you currently use is indeed problematic due to its proven vulnerabilities and inaccuracies. Diebold itself issued a Product Advisory Note about this machine on January 25, 2008 describing a known failure. http://www.votersunite.org/info/DieboldAdvisory25January2008.pdf [27]
See Exhibit B for articles describing the serious vulnerabilities and high error rate for the Diebold Optical Scanner.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: The very best thing New Hampshire could do is decertify the current equipment and find alterative means of vote counting. I strongly recommend hand counting all of the ballots. New Hampshire has established such an excellent system for community vote-counting, and the hand count method - especially the sort and stack method as was used for the recounts --that has time and time again proven to be the most accurate and by far the least costly method of counting citizens’ votes.
CITATIONS:
HAVA 301(a)(5) references the rate in the VSS - FEC Voting System Standards: Error rates: The error rate of the voting system in counting ballots (determined by taking into account only those errors which are attributable to the voting system and not attributable to an act of the voter) shall comply with the error rate standards established under section 3.2.1 of the voting systems standards issued by the Federal Election Commission which are in effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. (HAVA is referencing the 2002 VVS.)
Section 3.2.1 of the 2002 VVS: Accuracy Requirements: Voting system accuracy addresses the accuracy of data for each of the individual ballot positions that could be selected by a voter, including the positions that are not selected. For a voting system, accuracy is defined as the ability of the system to capture, record, store, consolidate and report the specific selections and absence of selections, made by the voter for each ballot position without error. Required accuracy is defined in terms of an error rate that for testing purposes represents the maximum number of errors allowed while processing a specified volume of data. This rate is set at a sufficiently stringent level such that the likelihood of voting system errors affecting the outcome of an election is exceptionally remote even in the closest of elections. The error rate is defined using a convention that recognizes differences in how vote data is processed by different types of voting systems. Paper-based and DRE systems have different processing steps. Some differences also exist between precinct count and central count systems. Therefore, the acceptable error rate applies separately and distinctly to each of the following functions: a. For all paper-based systems: 1) Scanning ballot positions on paper ballots to detect selections for individual candidates and contests; (partial omission here) For each processing function indicated above, the system shall achieve a target error rate of no more than one in 10,000,000 ballot positions, with a maximum acceptable error rate in the test process of one in 500,000 ballot positions.
VIOLATION #3: The location of the memory cards post-election were reported “unknown.”
Fact: According to election observers who spoke with Secretary Gardner during the recount, the location of memory cards used in the Primary Election on January 8th, 2008 was unknown. In conversations with observers he referenced the likelihood that town clerks/moderators had secured the cards but he was unaware of their exact location. Each memory card equates to an entire electronic ballot box. Ballots (which should include paper or electronic ballots) according to federal law must be preserved for 22 months following an election.
REMEDIAL ACTION: Since the memory cards are key to transparency, I request the State amend current procedures/statutes by creating a rigorous set of statutes regarding chain of custody for the memory cards, ballots and equipment as well as the memory card holders and workers, and further define how citizens can, in a timely manner, monitor the chain of custody and the content of said cards. I ask you to consider appropriate disciplinary actions, including felony or other charges to be filed against all persons whose responsibility it is to follow the laws pertaining to ballot retention but who failed to do so. One central location, through the Secretary of State, should be made responsible to account for all memory cards before, during, and after an election, and make those records available to the public in a timely manner if requested.
CITATIONS: I believe this is an implicit responsibility. The security of the ballots is tantamount and it is understood that they should be safeguarded at all times. The memory cards, as has been stated elsewhere, are equivalent to a ballot box filled with ballots.
VIOLATION #4: The boxes of ballots were not picked up for the recounts by State Police.
Fact. A van driven by two state employees, followed by a state trooper, drove around to pick up boxes of ballots at the various jurisdictions throughout the state. Their transport in a van driven by two state employees is not the same as the ballots being in the custody of the State Police. Election observers following the vans observed them speeding at 85 and 90 mph in 55 mph zones; speeding through school zones with school zone lights flashing; going 45 and 50 mph in 25 and 35mph residential areas, and making obvious and successful attempts to “lose” the citizen observers. The observers were left to wonder what was being done with the unsecured ballots inside the van and during the times after the van successfully “lost” their vehicles.
See Exhibit C.
REMEDIAL ACTION: I request that in the future that state police do transport the boxes. If one additional state employee rides with the trooper to carry the boxes, the statute should direct him to be in sight of said trooper at all times, including when the vehicle is in motion. When the vehicle is traveling all troopers and/or trooper and other state employees must be in passenger seats, separated from the boxes of ballots. This will prevent any appearance of possible ballot tampering while the ballots are being transported.
CITATIONS:
660:5 - Conduct of Recount. If directed by the secretary of state, the state police shall collect all ballots requested from the town or city clerks having custody of them and shall deliver them to the public facility designated by the secretary of state.
VIOLATION #5: Ballots were not stored and transported in boxes provided by the Secretary of State’s office.
Fact: Boxes arrived at the State Archive Building for the recount in non-uniform boxes, with various methods of taping, many not properly sealed. One jurisdiction sent their ballots in bundles wrapped in newspaper. Others came wrapped in brown paper. Some boxes came with no tape. Many ballots were returned in the same boxes in which they were received from the printer/Secretary of State’s office, but this led to some ambiguity about when and by whom openings in the boxes had been made.
See Exhibit D.
REMEDIAL ACTIONS REQUESTED: In the future, the boxes for transport of the ballots from the municipalities following an election, will in fact be different from the ones in which the ballots were delivered to the jurisdictions, to prevent any ambiguity about former openings in the boxes. The boxes should have no ‘clutter’ on them; and the boxes should be new, never used prior and be devoid of any writing other than instructions found in State Statutes (The New Hampshire government may take as many measures as possible to be frugal and mindful of expenditure of taxpayer money, but the additional boxes in this case would be a very small expenditure in the broad scheme of things and would go a long way to allay/prevent any suspicions, as well as to ensure security.) I am also requesting that the seals used on the boxes be of a more permanent nature where any unauthorized entry can be easily detected. In all future elections, I am requesting that the Office of the Secretary of State f ollow the statutes and procedures more closely regarding the conduct of elections. I also ask that greater scrutiny be paid by the Attorney General to all election and election recount operations. I would request that disciplinary consequences be mandated and enforced by the Secretary of State’s office for any future violations of any current regulations, of any remedial measures requested in this Petition of Appeal, or other future regulations.
CITATIONS:
659:95 Sealing and Certifying Ballots. I. Immediately after the ballots cast at a state election have been tabulated and the result has been announced and the return has been made, the moderator or the moderator's designee, in the presence of the selectmen or their designee, shall place the cast, cancelled and uncase ballots, including such ballots from any additional polling places, and further including the successfully challenged absentee ballots still contained in their envelopes, in the containers provided by the secretary of state as required by RSA 659:97 and shall seal such container with the sealer provided by the secretary of state as required by RSA 659:97. The moderator or the moderator's designee shall then enter in the appropriate blanks on such sealer on each container the number of cast, cancelled and uncast ballots in such container and shall endorse in the appropriate place on such sealer a certificate in substance as follows: Enclosed are the ballots from the state election in the town of (or in ward____ in the city of ) held on ________, 200__ required by law to be preserved. The moderator and the selectmen or their designees shall sign their names in the appropriate blanks on the sealer.
659:97 Secretary of State to Prepare Containers, Sealers. The secretary of state shall, before any state election, prepare and distribute to each town and ward clerk containers to be used for preserving ballots and sealers to seal each such container. He shall prepare special containers and sealers to be used for preserving any special and separate ballots for questions to voters and shall prescribe the form of any endorsement blank printed upon the sealers provided that the blank is in substance consistent with the provisions of RSA 659:95.
VIOLATION #6: Many ballot boxes were not properly sealed, and what were referred to as “seals” would not safeguard the ballots from tampering.
Fact: “Seals” meant to secure the boxes were in fact “labels”; they did not stick securely to the boxes, could be easily removed and re-attached, and left no evidence of having been removed and reattached from the box on which they’d been placed. As such they were not “seals” to the boxes; in order for the ballots to be secure, real tape was needed to bind the boxes. Many ballot boxes were delivered to the State Archive Building for recounting with tops not secured and with slits in them large enough for a hand to fit through.
See Exhibit E.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED:
In all future elections, the Office of the Secretary of State would clearly regulate for the cities and towns the appropriate means of securing all boxes of ballots. The seals ordered in the future must indeed be seals that seal the boxes in an unequivocally secure manner; if such seals are removed from any box prior to the time of any recount, it must be easily apparent to all observers. In any future recounts where boxes are found not to comply, the entire election would be deemed invalid.
CITATIONS:
659:95 Sealing and Certifying Ballots, cited above 659:97 Secretary of State to Prepare Containers, Sealers. The secretary of state shall, before any state election, prepare and distribute to each town and ward clerk containers to be used for preserving ballots and sealers to seal each such container. He shall prepare special containers and sealers to be used for preserving any special and separate ballots for questions to voters. The secretary of state shall prescribe the size and form of such containers and sealers and shall prescribe the form of any endorsement blank printed upon the sealers provided that the blank is in substance consistent with the provisions of RSA 659:95.
VIOLATION #7: The uncounted ballots were not always kept overnight in the security of the “ballot vault.”
Fact. At least on the night of the recount January 17 (and possibly other nights as well) boxes of uncounted ballots were not stored in the “vault” in the State Archive Building, but rather in the “counting room”, which is not a secure room. Election observers heard Secretary Gardner claiming that the room was secure because he put one of the easily-removable and easily-restick-able “seals” (see #6 above) across each of the double door entries to the room. See Exhibit F.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED:
New Hampshire could indeed lead the nation as an example of chain of custody security. Much is already in place. I ask you to consider adding some statutes that cover every aspect of the “chain of custody” of the ballots, such that every stage of the “chain of custody” is explicitly spelled out by future statute. These statutes would in turn be distributed to every office employee of the Secretary of State, to every city and town clerk and selectperson, to the state police, and to every other person involved in said chain of custody. Such future regulations must be complied with to the fullest degree. We recommend that you consider adding penalties and charges for any violations to every chain of custody statute. I feel it is important and critical to any democratic election that every step of the chain of custody of ballots, software, hardware and voting equipment be open to citizen scrutiny and observation. I am hopeful that you would also consider requiring all election officials to keep a log of every time any employee or outside companies such as LHS work on and/or make any changes to any aspect of the system. Ideally, cameras should be set up to be on the ballot boxes at all times and broadcast election day events live over the internet for citizens to oversee. (This could be extended to include the counting procedures as well.) Such a system -- and New Hampshire has much of it already in place -- would exemplify a secure chain of custody of ballots and of all related election materials that must be protected. The security of the ballots is tantamount and it is understood that they should be safeguarded at all times.
VIOLATION #8: Ballots were not always delivered in an open and public manner.
Fact: On many days of the recount, ballots were delivered after the recount had ended for the day, after dark, when most of the employees were gone from the building, and their delivery was not witnessed by any member of the public or citizen monitors.
See Exhibit G.
REMEDIAL ACTION REQUESTED: Same as # 7 above.
CITATIONS. Same as # 7 above.
WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED:
In the process of analyzing the recount and election procedures, I have identified the following two items as “ weaknesses” in current procedure:
1. The candidate in a recount cannot get access to all the different categories of ballots: Cast,. Spoiled, Blank, Uncast.It's critical for the integrity of the process that the candidate be able to account for the total number of all ballots in each category
Remedy: Either we have to adjust the recount procedure so that the uncast ballots are NOT excempt from Right to Know requests, OR have the Right to Know requests for all of these categories of ballots honored immediately upon submission of request.
2. There are inconsistencies in the execution of some election and recount protocols.
Remedy: We would like to be able to examine the actions and responsibilities of each Assistant and Deputy Secretary of State in order to determine which party is responsible for each step of the election and recount process.
To reiterate: Petitioner is proud to be an American when witnessing the organized, orderly, open and communal vote-counting process as executed in New Hampshire. Unfortunately, I also observed some gaps in ballot security and understand the vulnerabilities of the machines used in vote tabulation. I submit this petition with the desire and the belief that with a little attention and a few statutes addressing such things as ballot security and chain of custody, we can close those gaps. New Hampshire will be first in the nation to hold its Presidential Primary and it will be first in the nation in this century to have elections with observability, accountability, checks and balances, and real transparency.
The Ballot Law Commission’s rules places the burden of proof on the Petitioner for any and all complaints and allegations. Yet, it is impossible to completely fulfill the “burden of proof” obligation when the State refuses to provide me in a timely fashion with requested election data through the “Right to Know” law, and without giving me sufficient time to review the requested data prior to filing this petition within the three day period as required by law.
I am therefore requesting that the Secretary of State provide me with copies of all the data I have requested (on January 14, 2008 and February 1, 2008) from him and from LHS through the New Hampshire “Right to Know”; that I be given 14 days to review this data once received; and that I be allowed to re-file this petition if I so desire and to add additional violations and/or Exhibits if applicable.
As required by RSA 665:6, I am filing these Complaints today, February 15, 2008.
Signed and attested to by Albert Howard
Original Content at http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_andi_nov_080110_sign_up_to_take_... [28]
January 10, 2008
Sign Up to Take Back Our Elections – Register for the "I COUNT" Corps
By Andi Novick and Sally Castleman
At best there is “uncertainty” about the reported outcomes of the NH primary. Undoubtedly many other articles in this issue of OpEd News will be discussing them.
What we do know is that once again some doubt is being cast on the viability of machine counting of our votes. We believe it is time for us, the citizens of our nation, to take the actions that our ‘leaders’ have been refusing to take.
We are entitled to honest, transparent elections with appropriate checks and balances that the oblique processes of a computer prevent.
It is time for us to build our own corps of citizen counters. WE will count the ballots on election night. We propose that we, the people, sign up to count ballots on election night after the polls close. Much like jury duty, only one needs to commit for only 4 hours.
Our proposal is to hand count the federal races, which is never more than 3 races – President, Senator (some years), Representative. Calculation shows that only 1 in 4 citizens will ever be needed just once in their lifetime for a 4-hour stint to fulfill this highest order civic duty. Some, of course, may choose to do it more often.
Every team of counters would have a representative of at least two different parties. Citizens would be vetted, just as they are before being chosen to sit on a jury.
We urge anyone interested in learning more or anyone ready to sign up for the “I COUNT” corps, to sign up at [email protected] [29]. We will send you more details.
Andi Novick & Sally Castleman
Election Defense Alliance
______________________
Had Enough of "Faith-Based" Elections Entrusted to a Corporate Machine?
Click Here [30] for a quick, one-click way to write
your U.S. Senators, your Representative, and your regional newspaper all at once.
We provide a sample letter you can adapt to make your own. Copy, paste, alter, and add what you want to say.
Click here to Act [30]
When you're done, click to see the messages other citizens are sending too.
Election Defense Alliance is a program of Columbus Institute for Contemporary Journalism, a nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code.
Links:
[1] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/correcting_factual_errors_salon_was_NH_vote_stolen
[2] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/blog/eda
[3] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/outsourced_unaccountable_new_hampshire_election_system_blog011808
[4] http://www.dennis4president.com/go/homepage-items/kucinich-asks-for-new-hampshire-recount-in-the-interest-of-election-integrity/
[5] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/overview_NH_discrepancies
[6] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/machine_vs_paper_count_differential_nh_democratic_primary
[7] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/register_i_count_corps_hand_count_ballots_true_elections
[8] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/2008NHDemPrimComplete-EDA.xls
[9] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/2008NHRepPrimComplete-EDA.xls
[10] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/New_Hampshire_Binomial_Statistics
[11] http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/nh/new_hampshire_democratic_primary-194.html
[12] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/2008CORRECTEDNHRepPrimComplete-EDA-with anomaly.xls
[13] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/2008CORRECTEDNHDemPrimComplete-EDA-with anomaly.xls
[14] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/about_david_griscom
[15] http://www.checkthevotes.com
[16] http://www.RonPaulForums.com
[17] http://www.checkthevotes.com/faq
[18] http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/files/elections/2008/by_county/NH_Dem_0108.html?SITE=NHCONELN&SECTION=POLITICS
[19] http://ronrox.com/paulstats.php?party=DEMOCRATS
[20] http://ronrox.com/paulstats.php?party=REPUBLICANS
[21] http://whos.amung.us/show/2g02sp7p
[22] http://www.markcrispinmiller.blogspot.com/
[23] http://www.legitgov.org/nh_machine_vs_paper.html
[24] http://www.democracyfornewhampshire.com/node/view/5307
[25] http://www.legitgov.org/coup_2004.html
[26] http://www.legitgov.org/index_hot_April5.html
[27] http://www.votersunite.org/info/DieboldAdvisory25January2008.pdf
[28] http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_andi_nov_080110_sign_up_to_take_back.htm
[29] Mailto: [email protected]
[30] http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/petitions/pnum777.php