Action of the Day
FRIDAY Sept. 5 2008 However, the audio for the program will be available for download later tonight (Fri. 9/5/) at the following link: Blog comments associated with the show will probably also be updated by that time, so you will have an opportunity to add in your comments. TIMES: Friday Sept. 5 at 2-4 pm Eastern, 1-3 pm Central, and 11 am-1 pm Pacific.
This is a bonanza opportunity to access the huge National Public Radio audience to sharpen up the dialogue on computerized voting. Challenge the myth of "paper trails." Let the rest of the nation know just how serious our corrupted Read How to Get on Talk of the Nation (below) to improve your chances of getting on air. If the phone lines are busy, listen in while typing and sending in your comments by e-mail. SCROLL DOWN for phone #s , radio stations, E-mail addresses and directions. E-mail your question or comment for broadcast. Join the Online Discussion: Blog of the Nation http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/ [3] ==================== Phone-in: (800) 989-8255 Our Screening Policy: Read How to Get on Talk of the Nation, an April 2006 column from NPR's ombudsman. ===================== Broadcast Radio Stations (to listen by radio) Click here for a list of stations that carry Science Friday: http://www.sciencefriday.com/about/stations/ [5] ================================ or, Listen via Internet Radio: KQED, San Francisco [6] Michigan Radio [11] Texas Public Radio [15] windows [16] | mp3(.pls) [17] | Wisconsin Ideas Network [21] WAMU, Washington DC [25] MP3 [26] | Real Player [27] | KXOT, Seattle [29] Real [30] | (broadcast Friday, September 5th, 2008) With the official presidential campaign season now fully underway, we'll get an update on voting machines around the country. After a problem-riddled adoption of various electronic voting systems following the 2000 election, many states are now moving towards systems that can provide a voter-verified paper trail to ensure an accurate vote. In some states, voting machines that are only a few years old are being sold for scrap or auctioned on Ebay. But are there enough of the new machines to go around -- and are some areas of the country better equipped than others? And what about ballot design? We'll talk with Larry Norden, author of "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World," about voting technology around the country. Teachers, find more information about using Science Friday as a classroom resource in the Kids' Connection Guests Larry Norden Author, "The Machinery of Democracy: Protecting Elections in an Electronic World" Counsel, Brennan Center for Justice http://www.brennancenter.org/ [35] Related Links * VerifiedVoting.org The election season is in full swing, with the 'Super Tuesday' primary just days away. Communities around the country have adopted different types of electronic voting machines in the hopes of avoiding another 'hanging Maryland recently announced that it would be moving away from entirely electronic systems to ones in which paper ballots are read by electronic scanners. Florida and California have also turned away from all-electronic 'touch screen' designs. In this segment, we'll check in with computer security expert Avi Rubin about how states are using electronic voting systems. Aviel Rubin Segment produced by: Annette Heist 1. Vote (of course!) Sure it can be daunting -- talking to fellow citizens about democracy, and the government we share responsibility for. Take along a friend or two and suddenly, it's not so hard. INFORMATION SHEETS you can download, print, and hand out to voters: a. How Do You Know? (handbill) 8 mini-handbills per sheet. Photocopy and slice along cutlines. b. VOTERS' "TOP 10" 411 The "Top 10" factsheet above can be printed back-to-back with the election integrity volunteer form below: c. Election Integrity Volunteer Signup Sheet Be present at 8:00 with a clipboard, notepad, pen, flashlight -- and digital camera if you have one. Watch the pollworkers print out the machine end-of-day vote reports from the voting machines. Then copy by hand, or photograph, these "poll tapes" after the pollworkers post them on the outside of the polling site. If you can, please upload this information to the Precint Tally Capture Project: (link forthcoming) Things to bring: Clipboards, notepads, pens, digital cameras, video cameras, tape recorders, cell phones, and binoculars (to see the tabulator monitor screens). For further instructions on Central Count Monitoring, LOOK HERE [52] ALSO See BBV and OEJC guides below for additional details about what to watch for and questions to ask. BlackBoxVoting.org's Guide to Election Monitoring: What To Watch For [53] Also: Download the BlackboxVoting Citizen's Tool Kit [54] Ohio Election Justice Campaign: Quarantine That Machine! [55] Visit the posts under this topic at BBV to discuss Super Power Tuesday and report your own experience with issues like those discussed in this article. LOTS MORE INFORMATION: Download BlackBoxVoting's "2006 Citizens' Tool Kit" [57] for a comprehensive guide to election integrity actions year-round. For detailed action focused on the election cycle, download the 2008 Citizens' Tool Kit [58] edition. Journalistic malpractice What to do: Object and reject premature "calls." Get the facts, however long it takes, and report them, wherever you can. Also watch for: "The gray pie slice" -- In New Hampshire, CNN used a gray pie slice without a name to represent Ron Paul. Other candidates, even when pie What to do: Record coverage start to finish to gather evidence of any journalistic malpractice. Also watch for: Eroding vote totals. You may see candidate totals go DOWN during the count. What to do: Record coverage start to finish. Also watch for: What to do: Record television coverage start to finish to retain and examine later, and take screen shots of incoming AP totals from sites like http://www.politico.com [59]. WATCH FOR AND DOCUMENT VOTING RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN THREE AREAS: ACCESS TO VOTING What to do: DECEPTIVE PRACTICES What to do: If it happens in the polling place: If it happens outside the polling place: VOTE COUNTING CHAIN OF CUSTODY: Look for: What to do: ACCURACY OF THE VOTE COUNT Except in hand count locations, you will be unable to see your votes being counted. The counting is now controlled by government insiders and voting machine programmers. Your right to citizen sovereignty over your own government is at stake, and you have been placed in the position of trying to get circumstantial evidence to authenticate the count. This places an extraordinary and unsustainable burden on the citizenry. You can surrender the voting process to government insiders now, or you can put up a fight. Look for: What to do: After polls close, videotape poll closing activities and videotape the results tape and any other reconciliation forms filled out by poll On optical scan systems (fill in bubble, draw arrow): If you live in New York: Also: New York public records laws include the VENDORS in freedom of information requirements. IF YOU LIVE IN GEORGIA, KENTUCKY, CONNECTICUT: CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ABOUT ACCURACY OF THE VOTE COUNT Evidence means: Documents, video, audio and photos. SURRENDER NOW OR DIG IN FOR THE LONG HAUL It's easy to become overwhelmed. Yet, if many different citizens simply welcome the awakening of their own civic CITIZEN'S TOOL KIT: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/toolkit.html [60] Your vote will be counted as the paper trail reads at such an audit. The paper tape should read the same information as what you voted. If you wear Take Action! Typical reactions to expect to your complaint: (a) Have the voter move away from the machine. Thank the voter for catching the discrepancy, and explain to him/her what just happened. (b) Place an OUT OF ORDER sign on the machine and report the "malfunction" to independent law enforcement and notify the Board of Elections or election officials in your state of the problem. Then treat the problem voting machine as evidence in a possible crime scene. (c) Restart the voter on another machine, or on a paper ballot that will be counted, not a provisional ballot that "may" be counted. Empowering the Voters and Poll Workers for Detecting Possible Election Fraud and Demanding Legal Investigation A Special Note for Poll Workers and Election Officials In Ohio on December 17th, Michael W. Deemer, Chief Deputy Attorney General for Government Affairs of the Ohio Attorney General's office, and two other legal staff members were informed of the Quarantine The Machine program. His phone number is (614) 728-5462. They were asked to put something in place across the state of Ohio, and across the nation via the other state Attorneys General, to prepare for this program. A prepared written plan for law enforcement is needed, and has been requested. These proper authorities should have qualified individuals available to investigate the voting machines that are quarantined on election night. If the state of Ohio is not ready to deal with the citizen action of Quarantine That Machine, and the nations law enforcement has not been warned, you might want to call Chief Deputy Deemer and ask why. As of this date, February 4, 2008, and according to his office staff, nothing is in place now. They have informed the OEJC they will only prepare law enforcement if the Secretary of State requests them to. The Attorney General's office has been advised by the OEJC to prepare Ohio, and to let the other Attorneys General across the nation know this is coming. Prepare your Attorney General in your state, they may not know. For questions and press inquires, contact Paddy Shaffer, Director, 10. The power elites--the big corporations and their media subsidiaries--are controlling what messages you hear about problems with our election system. 9. Democrats and Republicans have both repeatedly demonstrated that neither have the interests of democracy and its voters at heart when it comes to the electoral process. 8. HAVA, the Help America Vote Act of 2002, was promoted as the solution to the “hanging chad” problems in Florida as well as an aid to the disabled and those citizens not fluent in English. In fact, it became a “feeding frenzy” for vendors of electronic computerized election equipment who saw it as an opportunity to gain money and favor from big government contracts—and to take a direct, if covert, hand in determining who governs America. 7. Beginning in 2004, many independent studies (e.g., Princeton and Johns Hopkins Universities, NYU’s Brennan Center, Congress’ Government Accountability Office, and several Secretaries of State) have proven that all software-driven equipment used in our elections is highly susceptible to malfunction and manipulation. 6. Many people believe that a mandatory “paper trail” and a spot audit of the trail, will make electronic voting secure. But there are simply too many ways around these provisions. 5. Audits, and even recounts, now have a history of being subverted, as much as the elections they are intended to validate. 4. There is NO REASON to assume that the vote the voter thought he or she cast on a touchscreen was what was recorded inside the machine and what was printed on the paper trail. There is NO REASON to assume that the vote on a paper ballot fed into an Optical Scanner is counted as the voter intended. 3. Using the rationale that disabled people need touchscreen machines for independent and private voting ignores the fact that totally mechanical paper-based systems have been developed as alternatives to computerized equipment and are being used in some jurisdictions with equal effectiveness. 2. Corporate take-over of our democracy is occurring right under our noses. Elections are now being owned, operated, and often decided by corporations – not voters. 1. An honest election system means that the citizens can actually SEE THE VOTES BEING COUNTED, and participate in the process. Without that, the rest is just a show. Election Defense Alliance (EDA) is a nationwide network of citizen election integrity groups and individuals We invite you to come work with us. http://www.ElectionDefenseAlliance.org [65] CLICK HERE to download Volunteer Signup Form [66] Election Defense Alliance is a project of International Humanities Center Click Here [68] for a quick, one-click way to write We provide a sample letter you can adapt to make your own. Copy, paste, alter, and add what you want to say. Click here to Act [69] When you're done, you can click a link to see the messages other citizens have sent. Volunteer to hand-count ballots in your local precinct: Click here to Join the I Count Corps [70] According to USA Today, a new report shows there is no evidence that significant numbers of voters are lying about their identity at the polls, voting twice or voting in the name of dead people. Yet across the country, burdensome voter ID bills and other legislation that disenfranchises eligible voters are being justified by this made-up epidemic. We deserve to know which threats are real and which threats are imaginary. Please petition the Elections Assistance Commission to release its report on voter fraud! Right-wing members of Congress and state legislators have been passing onerous laws that make it harder for citizens to vote. Despite erecting barriers to the ballot box and disenfranchising voters, they’ve claimed these laws are necessary to stop rampant voter fraud. Thanks to a press leak, it is now public that the US Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) commissioned a report to find out about voter fraud. While this has long been suspected by those of us who have fought discriminatory attempts to address “voter fraud” (e.g. voter ID bills that would, in effect, create a poll tax for poor, elderly and minority citizens who don’t have or need government issued ID in their regular lives), the Please petition the EAC to release the report at http://www.ReleaseTheReport.com [73]! Across the country, states have been introducing legislation requiring voters to show identification before voting, preventing eligible voters from casting ballots. Indeed, the US Congress has tried to pass national Voter ID legislation four times in the last four months – all in the Sign the petition [74] http://www.ReleaseTheReport.com [75] -- Alert Researched and Distributed by People For the American Way The following emergency response action comes from The PEN (Peoples' E-Mail Network) Everyone has heard about the dramatically suspicious results in the Jennings congressional race in FL-13, but did you know that there were massive parallel shenanigans going on in FL-24 as well? And yet we got a tip late today that tomorrow the House Administration committee is secretly, and without public notice, preparing to dismiss their own inquiry into this other still NOT conceded race run by Clint Curtis, the famous voting software rigging whistle blower. Since the election, dedicated volunteers have spent massive hours painstakingly collecting affidavits from citizens block by block in the district that constitute direct proof that the results in FL-24 are also not only beyond credulity, they are patently fraudulent. There is a still LIVE challenge to this election the Florida state courts, JUST AS in the Jennings case. So why is the House administration even considering refusal to hear this evidence, where it may even constitute evidence of a broader statewide conspiracy, and give additional weight to the Jennings FL-13 challenge as well? Because of the shortness of time this will be primarily a PHONE action. Please locate the member of the House Administration committee closest to you from the list below and call them first thing in the morning. Distance being equal you may find the Democrat more receptive. Tell them that even if you are not in their particular district, they are the closest House member to represent you on this committee. And ask them to give the evidence in the FL-24 ALSO the fair and just congressional hearing it deserves. You can call toll free at 800-828-0498, 800-459-1887 or 800-614-2803 and ask for your choice of House member below, in particular the CHIEF OF STAFF listed, or you can use their direct dial phone/fax numbers. MORE EVIDENTIARY INFORMATION IS BELOW THIS COMMITTEE MEMEBER LISTING SECTION CA-3 CA-16 CA-22 CA-53 MA-8 MI-3 PA-1 TX-20 THE HOUSE ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE'S POSSIBLE BOGUS REASONS FOR DISMISSING THE CLINT CURTIS CONTEST (talking points if you get challenged on the phone): * [Not enough evidence.] What we did not have is mainstream media coverage. What we do have is hard evidence that there is a discrepancy between the official count and the affidavits that were gathered from actual voters. * [Sworn affidavits not good enough.] In the past, it was exit polls that were considered not good enough because they did not connect the vote with the voter. Our system does exactly that. It is like having a paper ballots to count except even better. It is signed. Affidavits and eye witness testimony are the corner stone of our legal system. * [Your signature not good enough.] If the committee is not willing to accept what every court in the country requires as evidence, what level of proof are you willing to accept? * [Source code unknown.] If the committee requires the errors in the code to be found, we must be allowed access to the code and the machines. We are aware of hundreds of experts willing to independently examine and blueprint those proprietary systems should that opportunity become available. DETAILED BASIS OF THE CONTEST: The Congressional Contest filed by Clint Curtis is a Contest where the results of the election can be proven. Unlike Christine Jennings, whose loss was caused by 18,000 missing votes that unfortunately can never be found, Clint Curtis for Congress Campaign has found and tabulated data from actual voters that conclusively proves that Mr. Curtis received more votes than the official results recorded. The reason Mr Curtis did not concede is that although there was an apparent 16% loss, this loss did not reflect the Zogby Poll taken just weeks before the election that showed us within 2% points nor by the polling conducted by the online vote verification tool http://www.VoteNow2006.net [76]. The Zogby Poll also revealed that Curtis was leading among likely voters who describe themselves as Independents by a full 11 points. The opponents lead was just 45% to 43%, with one in ten (10%) undecided. The so called wide margin of 16 points in Mr. Curtis' race is the exact reason it possible to find where the count was not accurate. If the results were closer like a 51/49 split or 369 votes as in the Jennings race, it would have been nearly impossible to determine whether or not the official results were accurate. Every voter would have to be contacted to find the few votes that may not have been recorded accurately. On virtually every block walked by volunteers, the results have shown that more votes were cast for Clint Curtis than officially recorded. Walking for Democracy, the volunteers gathered sworn affidavits signed by the voters in District 24 as to how they voted for Governor, Congress and Amendment Three. The Governor's race and Amendment Three were control questions. The results from that data confirm the official results, while the data in this Congressional race is shown to be inaccurate. For example in Precinct 66 in Seminole County (highlighted below), official results showed that Mr. Curtis received 57% of the Democratic and Independent vote. According to the affidavits gathered however, he received over 80% of that vote. In each of the precincts that have been walked, he has received from 6%- 22% more Democratic and Independent votes than the official results. This simple method of determining how voters actually cast their ballot, can be independently verified. Congress can mandate a non-partisan group of volunteers or pay personnel to gather affidavits from District 24 voters. The cost is minimal and results easily obtainable. Congress owes it to the American people to determine once and for all whether or not the electronic voting machines counted accurately. This is not about partisan politics. This is about our Democracy. Please take action NOW, so we can win all victories that are supposed to be ours, and forward this message to everyone else you know. If you would like to get alerts like these, you can do so at http://www.millionphonemarch.com/in.htm [77] march50:113989 Powered by The People's Email Network Bookmark for daily updates on Pima Election Integrity Trial: http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/pima.html [78] See today's report from "Blog for Arizona" (Michael Bryan) crossposted at the EDA Blog [79]. [80] Tucson TV News Video Here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W9iXJahaGmk [81] (addresses below) Only the Board of Supervisors has the authority to decide whether to appeal the court's ruling, and they haven't yet met to make any decision on the matter. Tuesday morning January 8, 2007 we will present affidavits and letters from renowned computer scientists and election integrity activists stating that releasing these databases cannot harm national security as Chuck Huckelberry and his lawyers claim. Copies of the supporting declarations may be downloaded from the links at the foot of this article. Election Trial item early on agenda There are some 800 databases going back to May of 1998. Making them public could prove our votes were NOT counted inaccurately. If there is no probl The Democrats have also taken issue with several of Judge Miller's findings of fact as not supported by the testimony, and some of his conclusions of law as erroneous. See Democrats Motion to Amend for more details. Bill Risner make a powerful case that Judge Miller would be hard-pressed to ignore that the Judge quite simply got several points wrong in his under-advisement opinion. Discussion of the lawsuit will be one of the very first items on the agenda, so try to at the Board's Chambers by 9 am. Contact the Supervisors and let them know this is a critical issue for you. Sources near the case indicate the Board will probably vote to appeal unless Ann Day decides to vote with Ray Carroll. She should be the target of heaviest lobbying. Ray Carroll is already in support of election integrity; call and thank him for his leadership. Ann Day, District 1 Ramón Valadez, District 2 Sharon Bronson, District 3 Ray Carroll, District 4 Richard Elías, Chairman, District 5 See http://arizona.typepad.com/blog/pima.html [82] for in-depth coverage The release will allow Democratic Party activists to examine the results for evidence of tampering. The decision goes beyond a judge's order that the county release the final databases from the 2006 primary and general elections. But the crowd didn't disperse after the vote, instead remaining to speak at call to the audience, which is scheduled for the end of the meeting. Elections-integrity activist John Brakey; started shouting that people had waited far too long already and should not have to wait any longer. After hearing from more than 20 speakers, Elias made a motion to reconsider the earlier vote, and the supervisors voted unanimously to release the RTA records as well as the 2006 general and primary records. They also voted to release all the files associated with the three elections, instead of just the final databases, as ordered by the judge. At trial, the party presented witnesses who testified an elections employee took home backup files, and the county lost tapes of the RTA election after they were returned by the secretary of state. Pima County acknowledged security flaws in new technology and has developed a plan to address many of the problems. The county is accepting public comment on the plan until the end of the week. It is available on the county Web site, Activists have said the plan is a good start but still leaves the system vulnerable to hacking by an insider. County Administrator Chuck Huckelberry said he will present a revised plan and a summary of public concerns in February and suggested the supervisors could decide then if they want to ask for a court order to recount the paper ballots from the RTA to reassure the public the election was fair. Elias made a motion to have the county ask for such a recount, but it was not voted on because there was no agenda item related to the RTA election. Voting on items not on a posted agenda is a violation of the Open Meetings Act. Attorney Bill Risner, who represented the Democrats, said such court orders are hard to obtain, and the release of the database is a much more certain way to examine the election results, given the judge's ruling after the trial determined that election databases are public records. Risner said the party will develop a computer program to analyze the databases, which it will make available to anyone who wants it. Risner said there still are legal issues that have to be resolved. He wants a ruling that the databases always are public records and must be released promptly enough to let political parties challenge an election within the five-day deadline. Risner also has asked the court to award his team $279,907 in legal fees. Contact reporter Erica Meltzer at 807-7790 or [email protected] Tucson Citizen It is a victory for democracy through establishment of an open and transparent elections system and process. The Board of Supervisors, acceding to an unrelenting Supervisor Ray Carroll, voted not to appeal December's order by a Pima County Superior Court judge that the county release the elections data. Judge Michael Miller had ordered the county to turn over parts of elections electronic databases, from the 2006 primary and general elections, to the Pima County Democratic Party in response to its lawsuit questioning whether the elections system is secure and tamper-proof. The county had considered appealing that order, claiming the databases contained sensitive information whose release might make it easier to hack into the elections system. The supervisors rightly dropped the appeal threats Tuesday. And thanks to Carroll, supervisors went beyond that. The board also voted to release records of the 2006 Regional Transportation Authority election that were not included in the judge's order. Confidence and transparency are the cornerstones of a free-functioning democracy. The county would have risked losing those cornerstones had it continued fighting to keep its election data secret. Additionally, if voters believe their ballots will not be counted accurately and confidentially, if they believe something nefarious or underhanded is going on behind the scenes, election turnout will plunge. The case pulled aside the curtain of county election operations, exposing matters of substantial concern. Simple software manipulation could mean voters would cast their ballots one way, but they could be tabulated according to a hacker's wishes. This case demonstrated that voters are unwilling to take the county's word on election security without independent verification. By dropping appeal threats, releasing more material than the judge ordered and allowing qualified outsiders to look at the inner workings of elections, the county has moved to assure voters it has nothing to hide.
Call/Write into National Public Radio "Science Friday" and comment on "Voting Systems Update"
Sorry if you missed the Voting System segment of Science Friday.
That segment of the program was over before the alert could get distributed, and the audio and blog comments for the show are not posted online until several hours after the show is aired.
http://www.npr.org/rss/podcast.php?id=510221 [1]
Call or e-mail National Public Radio TODAY to comment on the "Voting Systems Update" topic in the Science Friday show.
privatized secret vote counting electoral system really is.
CONTACT INFO and DIRECTIONS
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Voting Systems Update
Segment produced by: Annette Heist
http://www.sciencefriday.com/kids/ [32]
Project director for the Voting Technology Assessment Project
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_machinery_of_democracy... [33]
http://www.amazon.com/o/ASIN/0897335538/sciencefriday/ [34]
New York University http://www.nyu.edu [36]
New York, New York
http://verifiedvoting.org/ [37]
* Brennan Center: Better Ballots
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/better_ballots/ [38]
* Federal Election Commission
http://www.fec.gov/ [39]
* usa.gov: voting and elections
http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/Voting.shtml [40]
* Voting and the election process
http://uspolitics.america.gov/uspolitics/elections/voting.html [41]
If you're interested, here is a similar program that was broadcast in February of this year.
Voting Machine Update (broadcast Friday, February 1st, 2008) Click for audio file.
chad' situation like the one that marred the 2000 presidential race. However, some communities are reconsidering their approach. Guests
Professor, Computer Science [42]
Technical Director, Information
Security Institute [43]
Johns Hopkins University [44]
Baltimore, MarylandRelated Links
Actions for Super Tuesday and Beyond
What You Can Do to Defend the Vote on Super Tuesday
2. Voter Education at the Polls
3. Record Precinct Data at Close of Polls
4. Monitor the Central Count at your County Elections Department
1. VOTE
Voting in person in your local precinct is always the best policy.
If you have an absentee (mail-in) ballot that you haven't already mailed, walk it in to your local polling site, or take it in person to the county election department.
2. VOTER EDUCATION at the POLLS
If you can "work the polls," election day is a great opportunity for effective voter education. (See informational flyer download links).
To avoid the appearance of "electioneering" you will have to meet voters 150 feet beyond the poll entrance. (See further notes below).
But it is necessary!
You will find it is one of the most satisfying civic action experiences you've ever had.
Try it -- you'll like it. Trust us on this.
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/HowDoYouKnow.pdf [49]
Color gets attention! Color copies cost about 50 cents. Otherwise, B&W will do.
What the Corporate Newsmedia Aren't Telling You About Elections and Your Vote
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf [50]
( Problem-solving Sequence: 1. Get Informed. 2. Take Corrective Action. Right? )
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf [51]
A Note About "Electioneering"
Some people -- including election officials -- may try to tell you what you're doing is "electioneering" and illegal. It's not.
You are informing people about the realities of computer vote counting, which is a multipartisan concern.
This has nothing to do with advocating a vote for or against any candidate or issue, therefore it IS NOT electioneering.
3. RECORD PRECINCT DATA at close of polls
Ask the pollworkers to copy or photograph the information on the pollworkers' signed summary report (sometimes called the "Blue Sheet")
that records how many voters cast ballots in the precinct; how many ballots were received, voted, or voided; how many foreign language and provisional ballots were cast; and other important information. Also ask to see and record the voter sign-in sheets (showing who voted at the precinct) and any machine trouble reports.
4. OBSERVE the CENTRAL COUNT at your COUNTY ELECTION DEPARTMENT
You are a member of the voting public and have the right to observe election procedures so long as you don't obstruct the election workers.
Don't let anybody tell you any different.ADDITIONAL GUIDES to ELECTION DAY MONITORING
(Treat election violations as a crime scene)
BBV Guide to Election Monitoring: What to Watch For
Watch for the media to announce who "wins" instead of stating "We predict (name of candidate) will win." News channels are supposed to report the news, not create the news. Results as reported by the news never match the actual results, by the way.
slices were smaller, were colored and had candidate names affixed.
Unusual fluctuations or insufficient variations with minor candidates.
In one Minnesota district in 2004, for example, ALL MINOR CANDIDATES received the same percentages of votes, until screen shots were posted
and questioned by Internet watchdogs. Then the vote totals were spread more normally. In Florida in 2000, at one point the Socialist Worker
Party candidate had more votes dumped into his totals in a single county than he received statewide. One strategy for electronic vote
manipulation involves use of minor candidate vote bins to store votes temporarily.
- Access to voting (voter rolls)
- Fairness (deceptive practices)
- Counting the votes
Watch for: - Registrations hijacked to a different party - Omissions and improper additions to the voter rolls The new "electronic pollbooks" help to block citizen oversight and also introduce sophisticated attack vectors.
Gather evidence: Documents, records, video, audio and photographs.
Persevere - keep gathering proof, even after the election is over.
Example: When voter registration is hijacked to a different party, there should be a paper trail. Find out your state's regulations for the paperwork
needed to change a voter's party preference. Use public records requests to request the backup documents. If they can't produce them,
expose the fraud by propagating the evidence, to blogs, legislators, citizens groups. Get your evidence to at least five different entities.
Find out if your local jurisdiction is now using electronic voter sign-in instead of observable paper pollbooks.
Watch for:
Omission of candidate names on the ballot or screen; misdirection about where/when/how to vote; misleading ballot design; confusing or
misleading instructions; intimidation tactics
Gather evidence and propagate it.
Call an elections worker over and show them; then ask that they write the incident down to document it, and watch to see that they do so.
Then submit a formal public records request for a copy of the incident report and any other incident reports throughout the jurisdiction.
Video, photograph, get documents, and if you obtain evidence, propagate it to at least five entities, including Internet sites, mainstream
news, legislators, elections officials and citizens groups.
Watch for: Whether you can see the chain of custody; whether you can see the votes themselves being counted.
The greatest risk for manipulation of the count is from inside access.
The best way to prevent vote-counting fraud by insiders is to require a fully public chain of custody. If chain of custody is not public, even
spot checks, audits and recounts will fail to ensure integrity in the election. Your ability to review chain of custody varies depending on your jurisdiction. Most locations nowadays have removed chain of custody from public view - which means citizens must go to
extraordinary lengths to learn the simplest information, if they can get it at all.
Weak links in the chain, or "narrow spots in the pipe" where just a few people, or just one person, has access to the votes before (or shortly
after) the vote count is announced. JUST ONE BROKEN LINK means the vote count cannot be trusted.
Get evidence of broken links, narrow spots in the pipeline, or inside-only access/oversight. Evidence means documents and videotape. Persevere
- it may take time to evaluate even one link in the chain. When you get evidence that the chain has been broken or left public view, propagate the evidence to at least five entities, like blogs, voting rights groups, open government groups, the media, and public officials. Prepare
a report with a local group of citizens, submit it to those with authority in your jurisdiction, request remediation of individual
issues before the next election.
On DRE (touch-screen, dial-a-vote) systems - observe screens carefully, watch for vote-hopping to selections you did not choose. The vote may hop to another choice immediately or after a delay, or even after you have page to a new screen.
Stop the process immediately, call an elections worker over, see if you can replicate it, request that they write the incident down, stay and
watch while they do so, make a formal request for the public record of their incident reports and all other incident reports in your jurisdiction. Double and triple check before casting votes, and document all anomalies. (If you witness vote-hopping on a dial-a-vote system like the Hart eSlate, document it using every means necessary and contact Black Box Voting, BradBlog, and VotersUnite.)
workers. If they won't let you videotape, then videotape them telling you that you cannot watch, or that you can't capture evidence of the
poll closing and counting procedures.
Observe whether the vote count increments when you deposit your ballot. After polls close, videotape poll closing activities and videotape the results tape from the optical scan machine and also videotape any other reconciliation forms filled out by poll workers. These should include number of ballots provided, cast, unused and spoiled, along with number of voters checked in to vote.
Most New Yorkers are voting on lever machines, which -- unlike the scanners and DREs -- are extremely difficult to tamper with in a wholesale, nontransparent way. However, many New Yorkers do not realize that customized Sequoia scanners are used to count tens of thousands of
absentee votes. Start asking questions about those votes (chain of custody, counting). Ascertain your rights to observe and examine your
computerized absentee counting system.
Consider submitting public records requests directly to Sequoia Voting Systems. Ask for things like correspondence, incident reports,
invoices, contracts. These vendor-directed records requests are especially important because it looks like New York's Nov. 2008 elections will be run on Sequoia computerized systems, or something similar.
You, too, can request public records DIRECTLY FROM THE VENDOR. Let's get to work on opening them up.
Compare number of voters checked in to vote with number of votes. Note any arithmetic that doesn't add up. You may also want to visit the main elections division for your jurisdiction to observe and record procedures and activities. If you cannot view and record the computer screen, you are being blocked from viewing even circumstantial evidence of the count. Check your state election law as to whether counting votes in secret has ever been authorized. Persevere. Take as much time as it takes to gather real evidence, including evidence of efforts to obstruct your right to oversee chain of custody and counting.
The Government is currently displacing citizen sovereignty over election processes. Assert your right to sovereignty via documentation and
oversight to authenticate election procedures and results, and when your rights are obstructed, gather evidence of this and propagate it. All
evidence you acquire during the primary election cycle should be applied towards regaining citizen sovereignty over elections in the
Nov. 2008 election.
duty, trust to their own common sense and innate creativity, and take just one step, the next will become clear.
Trust me on this. Good luck and God bless, Bev Harris Founder - Black Box Voting
Quarantine That Machine! Treat Election Violations as a Crime Scene
Subject: Treat improper voting machine functioning as a crime scene
Quarantine That Machine!
The Ohio Election Justice Campaign Announces Citizen Action To Take Back Our US Elections
If the voting machine you use behaves in an illegal manner, it should be treated as part of a crime scene. The theft of your vote is a crime by the voting machine & its vendors against YOU. Treat is as such.
What should I do, you ask?
If the touch screen voting machine you vote on in 2008, or at any time in the future, is behaving in a manner that appears illegal, it should be investigated.
What to look for, including but not limited to:
Vote Hopping -
This is when you vote for a candidate or an issue, and your vote hops and goes to another candidate or issue on the screen. We are
generally told it is a calibration problem. For the voter, this means you vote is not recorded for who or what you intended. You have been robbed.
Paper Tape records other than what you voted -
Please take the time to read the paper tape when you vote. If you find that the tape prints something other than what you voted, remember.there are many problems with the machines counting our votes in secret. There is no way to verify that the machine counted your vote as you see it on
the screen, nor as the paper tape reads. Yet, if there is a recount audit, the paper record is the voting record.
glasses, bring them, some tapes are printed very light, and therefore are hard to read.
Tell the Poll Worker / Election Judge what happened. Let them know you want the voting machine pulled from use in the election.
IMPORTANT! Do not harm or manipulate the machine. It needs to bet in the "same condition" for any forensic investigation. Tell the poll worker not to manipulate the machine in an effort to correct the problem. The most important step of taking action is then filing a police report with local law
enforcement to document this possible case of election fraud. The statistics later will document how widespread the problem is.
The reflex action of a typical judge when told that a voting machine is malfunctioning is to try to help the voter to get the machine working properly. But, when the malfunction is a mismatch between the faceplate and the paper trail, the normal "be-helpful" response many result in the destruction of evidence in a crime scene.
Let us say that a voting machine had been reprogrammed to flip every twentieth vote from candidate XX to candidate YY. Such an occasional
"malfunction" would not provide an easy-to-detect pattern. Further, it would be reasonable to assume that such a reprogrammed machine would
also be set to discontinue using the flipping subroutine when someone tries to correct the apparent "malfunction" by, for example, canceling
and re-voting.
Therefore, it seems reasonable for Poll Workers and Election Judges to be trained on how to react when a voting
machine has a mismatch between the faceplate and the paper trail, or for a vote that hops.
You are the public guardians of our elections. Please quarantine any machine for which a voter tells you of problems, asks for it to be
quarantined, or any that you are aware is malfunctioning in a suspicious manner; regardless of whether the voter knows that they may
request this. Please treat voters with respect if they ask to Quarantine The Machine, and do not push the buttons, or manipulate the
machine in any way. Treat the machine as part of a crime scene. Contact Law Enforcement to pick up the machine and investigate it, and write it
up. Let the Board of Elections, or other proper election officials above you know what has happened. A forensic examination of the machine
is needed, to study why it malfunctioned. It is our hope that law enforcement will confiscate these machines as possible evidence and
assist the public to get such a study done. These machines should not be returned to your local election officials but rather quarantined by
independent investigative authorities. We realize that there is going to be a huge problem. How do you get the existing votes out of such a
machine? It is our hope, that you will let them sit, and wait for the needed investigation.
The Ohio Election Justice Campaign, http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/OEJC [61]
http://www.wakeupandsaveyourcountry.com/oejc.html [62]
Top 10 Reasons Elections Are in Trouble
CLICK HERE to DOWNLOAD [63] and print this page as an informational handout
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/EDA_Top10_rev020508.pdf [64]
TOP TEN REASONS WHY OUR ELECTIONS ARE IN REAL TROUBLE…
What You Haven’t Read in the Paper or Heard on the News and Need To Know
It is a tried and true system, tested through the centuries.
WHY DON’T WE?
working at the national, state, and local levels to ensure that our election process is honest,
transparent, secure, subject to unambiguous verification, and fully accountable to the public.
http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/files/Volunteer_Signup_020508.pdf [67]
Let the People Count
Had Enough of "Faith-Based" Elections Entrusted to a Corporate Machine?
Tell Congress and the Media You Want Paper Ballots Counted By Hand in The Precincts
your U.S. Senators, your Representative, and your regional newspaper all at once.Want to do more?
Tell EAC to Release Report: No Evidence for Alleged "Voter Fraud"
http://www.ReleaseTheReport.com [71]
According to USA Today [72],the EAC’s report shows that there is no evidence that significant numbers of voters are lying about their identity at the polls, voting twice, or voting in the name of dead people. Let me repeat that: NO
EVIDENCE.
EAC report makes it official: voter fraud does not present a health risk to our democracy. That is, it would be official if the EAC had released it. … But it won’t release it.
name of stopping the one electoral cancer from which we don’t appear to be suffering. Worse, the mostly Republican legislators who are pushing such “prescriptions” are more like doctors who are getting kickbacks for prescribing cancer drugs to healthy people, insofar as they are keeping away from the polls voters who tend to cast ballots for the other party.
to the EAC urging that this report be released and that hearings be held on its findings. We deserve to know which threats are real and which threats are imaginary.May 8: Tell HCA, NO Coverup! Investigate Florida-24th CD!
Dan Lungren (R)
ph: (202) 225-5716, fax: (202) 226-1298
Chief of Staff: Victor Arnold-Bik
email: victor.arnold-bik.house.gov
Zoe Lofgren (D)
ph: (202) 225-3072, fax: (202) 225-3336
Chief of Staff: Stacey Leavandosky
email: stacey.leavandosky.house.gov
Kevin McCarthy (R)
ph: (202) 225-2915, fax: (202) 225-2908
Chief of Staff: James Min
email: james.min.house.gov
Susan A. Davis (D)
ph: (202) 225-2040, fax: (202) 225-2948
Chief of Staff: Lisa Sherman
email: lisa.sherman.house.gov
Michael Capuano (D)
ph: (202) 225-5111, fax: (202) 225-9322
Chief of Staff: Robert Primus
email: robert.primus.house.gov
Vernon Ehlers (R), Ranking Member
ph: (202) 225-3831, fax: (202) 225-5144
Chief of Staff: Bill McBride
email: bill.mcbride.house.gov
Robert A. Brady (D), Chair
ph: (202) 225-4731, fax: (202) 225-0088
Chief of Staff: Stan White
email: stan.white.house.gov
Charles A. Gonzalez (D)
ph: (202) 225-3236, fax: (202) 225-1915
Chief of Staff: Kevin Kimble
email: kevin.kimble.house.gov
Copyright 2007, Patent pending, All rights reservedPima Supervisors Vote to Disclose Election Databases
VICTORY!
Today the Pima County Supervisors voted to release the entire database series from 2006 primary, general, and RTA elections.
Congratulations to all involved, and particularly to John Brakey for spearheading this precedent-setting effort.
Also See Arizona Press Accounts of Today's Action: Click here
Jan. 8 Action: Lobby the Pima County Supervisors
The County Attorney has filed an apparently unauthorized notice of appeal, presumably purely on the word of County Administrator Chuck Huckelberry, or on the initiative of the County Attorney's office itself.Pima County Administration Building
130 W. Congress Street
First Floor Meeting Room
Please arrive by 9:00 a.m.
em, what is Pima County afraid of? Could these databases and audit logs prove the County committed election fraud?
(520) 740-2738
(520) 740-8126
(520) 740-8051
(520) 740-8094
(520) 740-8126Press Accounts on Pima Supervisors' Release of Vote Databases
RTA databases to be released
transportation sales tax for Pima County residents to approve a similar
levy.
year.
Faced with a raucous crowd of more than 60 people demanding the county release the RTA database, the Board of Supervisors Tuesday originally voted only not to appeal the judge's order, which amounted to agreeing to release those records.
Republican Supervisor Ray Carroll voted no because he wanted the RTA records released as well.
The issue was scheduled for an executive session to receive legal advice, but the supervisors remained in open session and heard from five speakers before the first vote.
Carroll repeatedly asked the other supervisors why they did not want to hear from the more than 30 people who signed speaker cards and continued his questioning after the vote.
Brakey sat down after board Chairman Richard Elias repeatedly told him he was out of order and threatened to have him removed.
"We cannot turn this into a carnival," Elias said as the crowd became increasingly unruly.
But as Brakey quieted, a chant went up: "We want our voices heard. We want our voices heard."
Elias then agreed to hear the speakers, some of whom said they were "disgusted" with having to "beg" for public records.
The Democratic Party says access to the computer files is necessary for it to perform its election-oversight duties in a high-tech age. Other parties also would have access to the files.
The crowd rose in a standing ovation after the vote.
The Regional Transportation Authority election created a half-cent sales tax to fund a $2 billion, 20-year transportation plan.
After raising concerns about practices within the county elections division and the security of electronic vote-counting machines, the county Democratic Party sued the county for access to the computer files from past elections.
www.pima.gov [83].
John Moffatt, a technology expert with the county, said it should be a simple matter of copying the databases to a disk, and he would work with representatives from all the recognized parties to get the information out as
soon as possible.
http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/daily/opinion/73553.php [84]
Our Opinion: Ray Carroll drives county move toward transparency
[email protected] [85]
Tuesday's decision by Pima County politicians to release elections-related data is the first step in restoring voter confidence.
Had the county appealed the ruling, voters would have gotten the clear impression that it was hiding something.
At trial last month, expert witnesses for the county conceded that the voting system could have been manipulated to swing elections results.
County officials said while that could have happened, it never did.
Ray Carroll championed open government by pushing for prompt and full release of all relevant data while fellow supervisors seemed content to meet the minimal required disclosure.
Tucson Citizen, AZ -
Tuesday's decision by Pima County politicians to release elections-related data is the first step in restoring voter confidence. ...
Tucson Citizen, AZ -
The Pima County Board of Supervisors voted Tuesday not to appeal a Superior Court judge's ruling to turn over computerized databases to the Pima County ...
Reclaim the Vote, Day by Day
Nov. 9 - Actions for Day 2 of Reclaiming the Vote (Click here) [88]
Nov 8 - Day 1, Reclaiming the Vote: "Widespread Vote-Switching" [89] -- EDA Data Analysis Project
THUR NOV 9 -- Day 2 of Reclaiming the Vote
Action 1
Send in Election Night CNN and CBS Exit Poll Screen Captures to EDA Data Analysis Project
Think the 2006 Midterm Elections were clean? Think again!
Early analysis shows that the mainstream media exit polls have been shifted about 3% to the right.
EDA was able to capture unadulterated exit poll figures for only a few of the states at a few time intervals.
Collecting as many of the original exit poll displays BEFORE they were "adjusted" is our highest election forensics priority.
(But keep on sending county and precinct election data, too!)
IMPORTANT! Do NOT just collect what is on news sites now.
Make sure you are sending in original, nonrevised exit polls you captured on election night.
REPEAT, the exit polls that are displaying now on news sites such as CNN and CBS have been falsified.
Send your exit poll captures from CNN* and CBS (two different exit polls)
to EDA Data Analysis [90]
(The CNN display is the main network news consortium exit poll. CBS commissioned a second, different exit poll).
Action 2
Observe and Collect the Manual Tallies in Your Counties-- Call Today!
(This action alert from Verified Voting, about the Transparency Project, a comprehensive plan to document all phases of the Midterm election.)
Today's focus: Capture the Voter Verified Paper Records and/or Manual Tally random sampling of the vote totals.
Read on, then phone your local election office to find out when and where these counts will be conducted, and go observe,record,and send in the results to the Transparency Project [91].
* (Please forward to the EDA Election Data Analysis Project [92] also).
__________________________
Friends,
We're now on the other side of Election Day -- can you believe it? But the election is not over yet -- the vote-counting continues, and so must our efforts to protect democracy! We need you, RIGHT NOW, to find out if and when manual audits are occurring in your area, and if they are, to go and observe the auditing process.
As many of you know firsthand, people in various parts of the country worked very hard over the last few years to achieve an important safety net for our democracy: voter-verified paper records (VVPR's) and routine manual audits. VVPR's provide for recovery of voter intent - and, thus, for accurate elections - in the case of machine failure. Manual auditing of the VVPR's serves as a diagnostic tool that can be used to pinpoint and uncover hidden problems, ensuring that our elections, no matter how smooth they may seem on the outside, accurately reflect the will of the people.
Please check to see whether audits might be happening in your area. If so, we urge you to IMMEDIATELY take the following steps:
1. Call the elections department in your county, township, or voting jurisdiction TODAY to find out when and where the audit will be conducted. Please be aware that the audits will begin VERY soon in most places, which means that you MUST call NOW.
2. Make sure you know the requirements to observe in your area, if any.
3. Participate in observing a portion or all of the audit process. Don't worry if you can't observe the whole process - any observation that you're able to conduct will be useful.
4. Complete Verified Voting's Audit Observation Questionnaire. There are two separate questionnaires -- one for manual audits of votes cast on a specific percentage of machines or percent/number of votes, the other for manual audits of a specific percentage of precincts -- depending on the state in which you live. Please keep reading for information on your area!
5. Submit your completed questionnaire to Verified Voting, so that we can compare auditing practices in different areas. The information that you submit will be made publicly available, minus any personally identifiable information.
You can submit your completed questionnaire online at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6409 [93],
or you can fax it to us at 940-403-2255,
or mail the hard copy to Verified Voting, 1550 Bryant St., Suite 855, San Francisco, CA 94103.
Out of the twenty-eight states that now have a VVPR requirement statewide, thirteen have an audit requirement (see http://verifiedvoting.org/audits [94]). KY and PA also have an audit requirement, even though there's no VVPR law -- and some additional states do them voluntarily.
If you live in CO, CT, NM, NY, WA, or PA:
Fill out the machine questionnaire, which can be downloaded here: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AuditQ-Machine.pdf [95]
If you live in AK, AZ, CA, HI, IL, KY, MN, NC, or WV:
Fill out the precinct questionnaire, which can be downloaded here: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AuditQ-Precinct.pdf [96]
A few additional notes on various states:
AZ - If you live here, due to the way the law is written, you may need to push to make sure the audit actually happens. AZ may need actual participants to carry out the audit, not just observers.
CO - Be a part of history! The audits here will be the first ever under the new statewide requirement.
MN - If you plan to observe in this state, please contact us at [email protected] [97], so that we can put you in touch with the group that is coordinating an observation effort there.
NM - This state's audit law doesn't take effect until 2007, but it would be a good idea for the Secretary of State to conduct one anyway. Consider orchestrating a letter-writing campaign to the Secretary of State to make it happen. People there have already been writing to the editors of local newspapers.
NV - There is no audit requirement here, but audits have been conducted for the past few years. Call your elections department for more information.
PA - Audits here are of a specific percent/number of votes (as opposed to a specific percentage of randomly selected machines or precincts).
VT - This state doesn't have an audit requirement, but might conduct one. Call your elections department to find out if it's happening.
Your observation of audits can help to:
- Pinpoint specific machine-related or vote-counting problems.
- Ensure that audits are being conducted in the way that they are supposed to be by law in your area, and if not, ensure documentation of errors that occur in the process.
- Determine the best methods for conducting audits in the future (e.g., is it better to randomly select machines? precincts? etc.).
Effective manual audits entail hand-counting a significant number of the paper ballots and comparing those totals to the machine counts in order to make sure the system is counting properly. Manual audits can help us tell whether the machinery of our democracy is working properly. Your participation will make a difference! Make that call now to find out where and when to GOTO - Get Out To Observe!
All the best,
Courtenay
Courtenay Strickland Bhatia
President, Verified Voting
415-487-2255 work
415-235-0126 cell
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/ [98]
Every vote must count as cast.
Aug. 4 Action: Study Decertification Directives and Thank Secretary Bowen!
E-mail to [email protected] [99] or phone (916) 651-7834
On August 3, 2007, Secretary Bowen announced her decisions regarding which systems in the review will be permitted to be used in the 2008 elections and beyond. The following documents detail Secretary Bowen's decisions.
Decertification/Recertification Decisions Issued August 3, 2007,
by California Secretary of State Debra Bowen
Diebold Election Systems, Inc.
- Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval [100] (.pdf, 6,734KB)
Hart InterCivic
- Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval for Hart System 6.2.1 [101] (.pdf, 5,886KB)
- Voluntary Withdrawal of Certification of Hart System 6.1 [102] (.pdf, 303KB)
Sequoia Voting Systems
- Withdrawal of Approval/Conditional Reapproval [103] (.pdf, 4,631KB)
Elections Systems and Software, Inc.
Voting Systems Certification
posted at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm [111]Below are the conclusions from Bowen's three source code reports
Thanks to Jim Soper, (Voting Rights Task Force, Alameda Co. CA) for providing this digest of the individual vendor system security reports. http://www.CountedAsCast.com [112]
DIEBOLD, pg 65
Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks. These vulnerabilities, if exploited, could jeopardize voter privacy and the integrity of elections. An attack could plausibly be accomplished by a single skilled individual
with temporary access to a single voting machine. The damage could be extensive—malicious code could spread to every voting machine in polling places and to county election servers. Even with a paper trail, malicious code might be able to subtly influence close elections, and it could disrupt elections by causing widespread equipment failure on election day.
We conclude that these problems arose because of a failure to design and build the system with security as a central focus, which led to the inconsistent application of accepted security engineering practices. For this reason, the safest way to repair the Diebold system is to reengineer it so that it is secure by design.
We discussed a number of limited solutions and procedural changes that may improve the security of the system, but we warn that implementing any particular set of technical or procedural safeguards may still be insufficient. Similarly, fixing individual flaws in the system—even all of the issues identified in this report—may not yield a secure voting system because of the possibility that unidentified problems will be exploited. We are also concerned that future updates to the system may introduce new, unknown vulnerabilities or fail to adequately correct known ones. We
urge the state to conduct further studies to determine whether any new or updated voting systems are secure.
SEQUOIA, Pg 82
We found pervasive security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia software. Virtually every important software security mechanism is vulnerable to circumvention. The integrity of elections conducted with the system depends almost entirely on the physical security of the equipment and the procedural controls under
which election operations are conducted.
Whether the software vulnerabilities we describe can be compensated for with procedural and physical security mitigations depends on a range of factors, most of which were beyond the scope of this study. However, we caution that mitigation will place considerable additional pressure on physical security features (such as locks and seals) and human procedures (such as two-person control by poll workers). Many of the physical security features and procedures typically used with the
Sequoia system appear to have been engineered under the assumption that the underlying software is considerably more secure than it actually is, and thus may not provide sufficient protection in light of the vulnerabilities discussed here.
Designing robust, practical, and effective procedures that substantially reduce the risks identified in this report would itself
be a very complex task, requiring a broad range of computer security, physical security, legal, and operational elections expertise. As a starting point, we attempted to identify mitigation strategies for the vulnerabilities we discovered. Unfortunately, we were unable to find practical strategies that reliably prevent exploitation of some of the system’s weaknesses. Fixing some of the problems will require substantial changes to the software and the architecture. In fact, we are not optimistic that acceptable practical and secure mitigation
procedures are even possible for some of the Sequoia system’s components and features, at least in the absence of a comprehensive re-engineering of the system itself.
The problem is compounded by the inter-related nature of many of the vulnerabilities and the relative ease with which certain attacks can be carried out. As the table in Figure 5.2 summarized, even brief exposure of many system components to an attacker can have ramifications beyond the components themselves.
Of particular concern is that virtually every software mechanism related to counting votes is
exposed, directly or indirectly, to compromise through tampering with equipment that is deployed in the field. In many cases, tampering sufficient to cause compromise requires only brief physical access and may leave behind little or no evidence.
We are regrettably unable to suggest with confidence any comprehensive strategy for mitigating the vulnerabilities in the Sequoia system that simultaneously provides a high assurance of security, maintains accessible DRE voting, and substantially incorporates existing hardware and software.
HART, pg 87
Although we had only limited time to review the source code of the system, our review nevertheless uncovered what we believe to be a number of significant security issues. In many cases the Hart system does not incorporate defense-in-depth principles, which may allow individual attacks to be escalated up to much broader attacks.
The Hart software and devices appear to be susceptible to a variety of attacks which would allow an attacker to gain control of some or all of the systems in a county:
• The Hart eScan, eSlate, and JBC devices incorporate an unsecured management capability. We believe that given brief physical access to an eScan, eSlate, or JBC device, an attacker can subvert it and overwrite the existing software with malicious software of his choice.
• These attacks could be mounted by a poll worker or possibly by a voter while in the process of voting. The effects of such an attack are essentially permanent; once malicious software is loaded onto such a device, there is no realistic way to remove it.
• Subversion of single polling place devices can be used to mount a variety of vote forgery and ballot stuffing attacks.
• The mechanisms provided by Hart for detecting device subversion appear to be easy to bypass and therefore system subversion is likely to go undetected.
• The Hart back-end SERVO software contains multiple buffer overflows which appear to be remotely exploitable by a single compromised polling place device. We have exploited one of these in our test environment and used it to install software of our choice on the SERVO machine.
By combining the above attacks, a malicious pollworker could subvert an eScan, through that SERVO, and through SERVO all the machines in the county for the next election. We have tested what we believe to be the essential elements of this attack but not performed an end-to-end test. Furthermore, a malicious voter could subvert a single eSlate, through that SERVO, and through SERVO all the machines in a county for the next election. We have tested some but not all of the elements of this attack.
Beyond direct system compromise, we found that Hart’s management of ballot and vote data is vulnerable to several attacks:
• Hart’s cryptographic key management requires a county-wide symmetric key which is stored on vulnerable field devices. This key can be obtained by an attacker with brief physical access to an eScan or JBC.
• Compromise of this single key would allow an attacker to forge both ballot information and vote results.
• We found multiple avenues for compromising voter privacy, enabling both vote buying/coercion and wholesale information gathering attacks.
This list does not include all the issues discovered during our review and there may be other issues that would be uncovered with further review. We encourage the Secretary of State to undertake such a review.
We stress that due to limited time and access to Hart equipment, we did not attempt to validate all of the above issues. In the body of the report we clearly indicate the validation status of each issue. We encourage the Secretary of State and Hart to attempt such validation.
Some of these issues can be mitigated with stricter polling place procedures. Others may be repaired with minor modifications to Hart’s systems, while yet others may require significant redesign. Providing a complete assessment of mitigation strategies was out of scope of this review, but we encourage the Hart and the Secretary of State to study
these issues.
We have deliberately avoided addressing the broader issue of whether or how this system should be used for voting in California. Making that judgement requires assessing not only the technical issues described in this report but also the procedures and policies with which the system is used.
Top To Bottom Review
To watch the archived video of the July 30, 2007, public hearing on the Top-To-Bottom Review, please click here. [113]
To read the transcript of the hearing, please click here. [114]
Secretary of State Debra Bowen began her top-to-bottom review of the voting machines certified for use in California on May 31, 2007. The review is designed to restore the public's confidence in the integrity of the electoral process and is designed to ensure that California voters are being asked to cast their ballots on machines that are secure, accurate, reliable, and accessible.
Voting Systems Certification
UC Final Reports
The University of California has submitted the reports on the findings from the top-to-bottom review. The red team and source code team reports are separated by voting system. The accessibility report contains findings on all of the voting systems that were reviewed. The document review team submitted their reports on schedule. Their reports will be posted as soon as the Secretary of State ensures the reports do not inadvertently disclose security-sensitive information.
UC Source Code Team Reports:
- Principal Investigator's Statement on Protection of Security-Sensitive Information [121] (.pdf, 13.9KB)
- Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. [122] (.pdf, 561KB)
- Hart InterCivic [123] (.pdf, 573KB)
- Sequoia Voting Systems [124] (.pdf, 831KB)
UC Red Team Reports:
- Overview by UC Principal Investigator Matt Bishop [125] (.pdf, 303KB)
- Diebold Elections Systems, Inc. [126] (.pdf, 498KB)
- Hart InterCivic [127] (.pdf, 376KB)
- Sequoia Voting Systems [128] (.pdf, 108KB)
UC Accessibility Report:
- Accessibility Report [129] (.pdf, 1.07MB)
 |
U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION1225 New York Ave. NW Suite 1100Washington, DC 20005 |
For Immediate Release
August 3, 2007
Contact:
Jeannie Layson
Bryan Whitener
(202) 566-3100
EAC Will Post and Distribute State Reports on Voting Systems
WASHINGTON- The United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has
adopted a policy authorizing staff to post and distribute
voting system reports and studies that have been conducted or commissioned by a state or local government.
"EAC believes it is important to provide a central location for election officials to post reports about their voting systems that can be shared with election officials throughout the nation and the
public," said Chairwoman Donetta Davidson. "This will provide an opportunity for election officials to share critical information and good ideas.
"As part of our role as the national clearinghouse for election information, EAC will continue to explore ways to share and distribute information about how, where and when we vote."
The new policy is part of the EAC's clearinghouse responsibilities under Section 202 of the Help America Vote Act. To be considered for posting on the EAC website, a state or local government must submit the report to the EAC chair or executive director and certify that the
report reflects their experience operating voting systems or implementing EAC's voluntary voting systems guidelines.
EAC is also operating the federal government's first voting system certification program. For information on voting system test labs, registered voting system manufacturers, voting systems that have been submitted for testing, test plans, notices of clarification, and other program-related information, click here.
EAC is an independent bipartisan commission created by HAVA. It is charged with administering payments to states and developing guidance to meet HAVA requirements, adopting voluntary voting system guidelines, and accrediting voting system test laboratories and certifying voting equipment. EAC also serves as a national clearinghouse and resource of information regarding election
administration. The four EAC commissioners are Donetta Davidson, chair; Rosemary Rodriguez, vice chair; Caroline Hunter; and Gracia Hillman.
Continuing: Oppose S.1487 and H.R. 811 as Written
The Rules Committee of the US Senate will reportedly be conducting a hearing on S1487 on July 25.
CURRENT ACTIONS for the week of July 30:
1. Call your Senators to Oppose S. 1487 [130]
S . 1487 is a dangerous, anti-democratic measure even worse than H. R. 811. Amend or end.
2. Call your Representatives to Amend or Reject H.R. 811 [131]
A well-intentioned, if misguided election reform bill that the vendors' amendments twisted into the "Voter Con" Act of 2007
It seems beyond repair at this point.
3. Instead, urge your Representatives to Co-sponsor the Kucinich bill [132] or push to correct the corruptions of H.R. 811 with these amendments: A Five-Point Proposal for Real Election Reform [133]
4. California: Voting Systems Review Hearing -- Support Secretary of State Bowen in Protecting the Vote
Click here for Action Details [134]
Details on S.1487:
Please contact both your US Senators (contacts below), and ask them to oppose S. 1487 as written.
Ask your senators to read this analysis [135], and work to improve the bill.
If the bill is not improved by amendment, Senators should withdraw their support and vote it down.
For in-depth background and talking points, see these articles on S. 1487: http://www.electiondefensealliance.org/s1487_analysis [136]
Senate Contacts: http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm [137]
There are 25 areas of function, and many of them have severe problems.
I hope that all activists can agree that this bill is the wrong way to election reform.
I hope we can have a strong showing at the hearing next week, to demand a better bill and to make sure that our Senators understand why each of these flaws is wrong, and how to improve it.
--Teresa Hommel
New Jersey Should Investigate Sequoia [03.19.08]
ACTION ALERT: New Jersey Should Investigate Sequoia and Move to Paper Ballots
March 19, 2008
Thanks to Kathy Dopp and John Gideon for providing the ingredients for this action alert.
Please take a minute and fill out this email form. Also ask your New Jersey friends to call on the NJ attorney general to authorize an independent investigation into the malfunctioning Sequoia voting machines. (Princeton University Computer Scientist Ed Felten has volunteered to do the investigation for free!)
http://www.nj.gov/lps/formmail.htm [138]
Also ask the NJ attorney general -- who is also the chief state election official in NJ -- why she has not saved New Jersey taxpayer monies by switching to paper ballot optical scan systems to comply with legal requirement for auditing NJ elections -- rather than asking for delay after delay in meeting the legal requirements for election auditing.
Cost comparison studies showing that the costs of all-new optical scanning equipment pays for itself in reduced election administration costs within four years and then saves lots of money.
(See http://electionmathematics.org [139] and click on "Voting Systems" for cost comparisons)
These news articles on the N.J. situation are forwarded from the Daily Voting News:
NJ: Interesting Email from Sequoia
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1265 [140]
NJ: Sequoia Voting Systems Threatens Princeton Computer Scientists with Legal Action
if they Carry Out NJ Commissioned Analysis of the Company's Touch-Screen Voting Machines
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5814 [141]
NJ: Voting data test is blocked
Manufacturer cites licensing violation
http://www.nj.com/news/times/index.ssf?/base/news-4/ [142]
120581310587220.xml&coll=5
NJ: Legal threat thwarts Union voting-machine check
http://www.nj.com/news/ledger/jersey/index.ssf?/base/news-9/ [143]
1205818545270600.xml&coll=1
NJ: State Senate OKs delaying vote-verification method
The paper procedure won't be ready by the Nov. election, N.J. said.
Touch-screens bring doubts.
http://www.philly.com/inquirer/local/ [144]
20080318_State_Senate_OKs_delaying_vote-verification_method.html
NJ: E-Voting Firm Threatens Ed Felten If He Reviews Its E-Voting Machine
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20080317/185348564.shtml [145]
NJ: E-Voting Vendor Threatens Princeton Computer Scientists With Legal Action
http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/article/2826/e-voting-vendor [146]-
threatens-princeton-computer-scientists-with-legal-action
NJ: Voting Machine Company Strong-Arm Tactics Succeed in Blocking New Jersey Investigation (So Far)
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=5820 [147]
NJ: Voting-Machine Maker to Princeton Researcher: 'Hands Off'
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2008/03/18/voting-machine-maker-to [148]-
princeton-researcher-hands-off/?mod=googlenews_wsj
Transparency Project: Now Through Election Day --Anyone Can Do This
[This page was originally published in advance of the 2006 midterm elections, but the recommendations are perennial and the links are still good.]
The Transparency Project is a methodology prepared by Verified Voting.org to enlist voters everywhere in taking checklists along when they go to vote at the polls, and recording what you can readily observe or learn by asking questions. Some of the checklists apply to pre- and post-election day event monitoring, and require an additional measure of preparation and commitment. But these are tasks that any voter can do.
The purpose is to get a detailed snapshot of the state of our elections from many localities, and assemble into a big picture, utilizing large numbers of participating citizen observors.
In addition to the state and local Election Transparency Scorecards, Pre-Election Testing and Early Voting Questionnaires, you can now download questionnaires to guide you in observing ballot accounting (reconciling the number of votes cast versus the number of voters who signed in) at the time the polls close on Election Day, and in observing auditing in areas that already have a voter-verified paper record and that plan to conduct manual audits after Election Day.
In addition, you can also download our new Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire, which is available in three different versions -- on the web, in text format, and in large print.
To access the full set of questionnaires, simply go to https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6390.
Not sure where to start? Begin filling out our Election Transparency Scorecards right now!
Don't wait for Election Day in order to take action!
You can complete the Election Transparency Scorecards for your state and county RIGHT NOW, even before Election Day. Oftentimes, you can do this from your own home as long as you can make some phone calls to your elections department. These scorecards will provide crucial background information for whatever incidents occur on Election Day.
For example, with information from the scorecards, we'll be able to find out whether locales with LESS transparency and openness in their process have MORE problems on Election Day. Worried that you won't be able to answer all the questions on the scorecards? Don't worry -- we'll be happy to receive any information you can gather. Not a part of an election observation group? No problem -- these scorecards can be completed by individuals. Not sure if you can finish the scorecard by Election Day? That's okay too... we can still use your information even after the elections are over (but the sooner, the better!).
If you plan to complete an Election Transparency Scorecard for your state and/or your county (or other local voting jurisdiction), please e-mail us at [email protected] [149]
and tell us which state and/or local jurisdiction you're covering. We'd like to get a scorecard in for every state in the nation, and as many counties as possible! By letting us know which you're covering, we'll be able to fill in the gaps.
The state Election Transparency Scorecard can be downloaded at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardState.pdf [150].
The local (county) Election Transparency Scorecard can be downloaded at http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/ETScorecardLocal.pdf [151].
Wondering what you can do on Election Day? Take the Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire with you when you go to vote!
When you go to vote, make it an opportunity to observe! Take our Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire with you and use it to gather information on the level of access to the voting process for persons with disabilities. Here at Verified Voting, we want nothing less than a voting system and process that provides full access to the ballot for all our citizens, privacy and independence in casting the ballot, and an accurate count of the ballots cast. Measuring the level of accessibility will help us know where there are obstacles that need to be addressed.
The Voting Process Accessibility Questionnaire can be downloaded at https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6401 [152].
Join the Election Transparency Project discussion list -- [email protected] [153]!
Verified Voting is happy to announce our new Election Transparency Project nonpartisan discussion list, [email protected] [154]. This discussion list was created just for you, the Election Transparency Project volunteers. By subscribing, you’ll be able to communicate easily with other Election Transparency Project volunteers and citizen observers from all over the country. The movement for free and fair elections is vibrant and alive and growing! Join the WatchTheVote list to connect with other Election Transparency Project participants!
To subscribe to the WatchTheVote discussion list, go to http://vevo.verifiedvoting.org/mailman/listinfo/watchthevote [155].
Nonpartisan posts related to voting and elections are welcome!
Good news! Voter Action's legal team is here to help!
Voter Action will be offering legal support to project participants for DRE-related voting machine problems before, on, and after Election Day via its toll-free number -- 1-888-SAV-VOTE. Voter Action's legal teams will also lend their legal eye to the information that we gather through this project. Verified Voting is grateful to have Voter Action's legal support, and happy that Voter Action is encouraging people to get out and observe through its recently announced Watch The Vote national outreach campaign.
Wondering how to submit the data that you've gathered?
Never fear! We'll be sending more info to your inbox soon on how to submit the data that you collect. Rest assured that it'll be simple, easy, and painless. We'll also offer some training sessions for those who choose to enter their data via our online system -- more on that soon! Remember, the info that you provide will be the springboard for reforms to the election process for years to come.
We're counting on you to help us secure trustworthy elections for the United States. If you have any questions or concerns, please don't hesitate to contact us at [email protected] [156], or at 415-487-2255. Thanks so much for your dedication and commitment to saving our democracy!
Most sincerely,
Courtenay Strickland Bhatia, Verified Voting President, Dr. David Dill, Verified Voting Founder, and the rest of the Verified Voting Team
Verified Voting Foundation
1550 Bryant St., Suite 855
San Francisco, CA 94103
415-487-2255 phone
940-403-2255 fax
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/ [157]
Every vote must count as cast.
CA Voting System Review Hearing July 30
Some Practical Preparations:
-- Write out and practice delivering your 2-minute Public Comment statement "Members of the public are encouraged to submit written comments on agenda items. -- Research a more in-depth critique of the voting systems components up for review [scroll down to see listing] -- More extended statements can also be made with prior arrangement "Those wishing to provide an extended statement should submit a request via the email address above or contact Lowell Finley at (916) 653-7244 at least 24 hours prior to the meeting." -- Download the sign template files in the attachments box at the foot of this page and print out signs to bring -- Help compile a list of reporters to send a pre-event press release Journalists in any media (newspaper, blog, radio, tv) for whom you have their personal, direct work address, phone, and fax -- Car Pool Arrangements Click here for the Sacramento Car Pool Blog [160] --Amtrak Train is also an option; the Capitol Corridor line runs up from the Peninsula to Sacramento.
Rally and Press Conference starting 9:00 a.m.
Formal Hearing at 10:00 a.m.
Written comment should be sent by US mail to the address above or by email to [email protected] [158].
Those wishing to provide oral comment at a meeting should complete a speaker's card upon arrival."
Click here for comprehensive background on CA Voting System Review [159]
(See below for a sample)
We can probably engage the assistance of a veteran Sacramento publicity specialist who has aided CEPN actions in the past.
Click here for Amtrak ticket and route information [161]
Click here for the Sacramento train schedule [162]
Click to download Walking Map [163] from the Sacramento Amtrak station to the Offices of the Secretary of State (30-minute walk)
PUBLIC HEARING
LOCATION
Office of the Secretary of State
1500 11th Street
1st Floor – Auditorium
Sacramento, California 95814
HEARING DATE AND TIME : July 30, 2007, 10:00 a.m.
NOTICE
Notice is hereby given that a public hearing will be held to give interested persons an opportunity to express their views regarding the Top-to-Bottom Review of the voting systems identified below:
1. SEQUOIA WinEDS version 3.1.012/Edge/Insight/400-C
a. WinEDS, version 3.1.012
b. AVC Edge Model I, firmware version 5.0.24
c. AVC Edge Model II, firmware version 5.0.24
d. VeriVote Printer
e. Optech 400-C/WinETP firmware version 1.12.4
f. Optech Insight, APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
g. Optech Insight Plus, APX K2.10, HPX K1.42
h. Card Activator, version 5.0.21
i. HAAT Model 50, version 1.0.69L
j. Memory Pack Reader (MPR), firmware version 2.15
2. DIEBOLD GEMS 1.18.24/AccuVote
a. GEMS software, version 1.18.24
b. AccuVote-TSX with AccuView Printer Module and Ballot Station firmwa