A collection of information about electronic voting machine vendors, deployment of electronic voting machines, documented evidence of machine failures and demonstrations of hacking vulnerabilities.
Source: Election Assistance Commission
Download Complete 50-State Report [1]
How to Use This Guide
Introduction:
Section 311 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA) requires the U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) to periodically adopt standards for voting systems in the form of Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG). Section 231 of HAVA further requires the EAC to provide for the testing, certification, decertification, and recertification of voting system hardware and software to these Federal standards.
To accomplish this goal, HAVA requires the EAC to develop a program to provide accreditation and revocation of accreditation of independent, non-federal laboratories to test voting systems. In this way, the EAC’s Certification Program provides (1) Voluntary Voting System Standards, (2) voting system testing by accredited laboratories, and (3) voting system certification.
Participation in these EAC programs is strictly voluntary. However, some states have, through legislation or administrative rules, mandated participation in EAC’s Testing and Certification Program in varying degrees. Currently, 35 states mandate some element of EAC’s Testing and Certification Program.
This document [1] consists of a summary table, a fact sheet for each state, territory, and the District of Columbia, and an appendix of state statutes and administrative rules.
Methodology:
The purpose of this document is to provide a broad overview of the degree to which states have (though statutes or administrative rules) mandated the use of EAC’s Certification Program. In looking at state requirements in this area, it was apparent that states took varying approaches in what they required and the language used to require it.
Because of the diversity of approaches taken by the states, it was difficult to develop a document that could serve as a useful tool in understanding the big picture. To address this issue, EAC staff classified each state’s requirements into four groups:
(1) No Federal Requirements
(2) Requires Testing to Federal Standards
(3) Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory
(4) Requires Federal Certification.
These classifications required staff to review each statute and make a determination based upon its plain language. In each case, the language of the reviewed statutes and regulations is provided so that readers can make their own determination about the effect of the jurisdiction’s statutes and/or regulations.
Please note that this document is meant to provide a general understanding regarding relationship between state and Federal certification. It is not meant to provide a definitive interpretation of state law. The EAC recognizes that such interpretation is not the purview of the Federal government. This document is not intended to provide an authoritative interpretation of state law.
In viewing each category, it is important to note that the classification only reflects state statutes and regulations. It does not address policy or practice. The fact that a state has not statutorily mandated the use of EAC’s Certification program does not mean that they do not utilize the program. For example, we noted that some small states, which have historically relied on national certification, are not required to do so by their jurisdiction’s statutes or regulations.
It is also important to remember that classification is based upon a narrow interpretation of the state requirement, not necessarily on intent. For example, when a state required voting systems to be certified by an accredited laboratory (as opposed to the EAC), staff read this requirement only as requiring testing by Federal laboratories and not requiring Federal Certification. Description of Categories: EAC staff reviewed statutes and administrative regulations for all states, territories, and the District of Columbia to determine what level of participation each may require regarding EAC’s Testing and Certification Program.
The following is a description of each category:
1. No Federal Requirements:
Relevant state statutes and/or rules make no mention of any federal agency, certification program, laboratory, or standard.
2. Requires Testing to Federal Standards:
Relevant state statutes and/or rules require testing to Federal voting system standards (states reference standards drafted by the Federal Election Commission (FEC), National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the EAC).
3. Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory:
Relevant state statutes and/or rules require testing by a federally or nationally accredited laboratory.
4. Requires Federal Certification:
Relevant state statutes and/or rules require that voting systems be certified by a federal agency.
1. No Federal Requirements -- 20 States
AK AS AR FL GU HI KS ME MS MT NE NH NJ OK PR TN VT VI WV WY
2. Requires Testing to Federal Standards -- 10 States
CT DC IN KY MN NV NY OR TX VA
3. Requires Testing by a Federally Accredited Laboratory -- 15 States
AL AZ IL IA LA* MD* MA MI* MO NM OH PA RI* UT* WI* WA
4. Requires Federal Certification -- 10 States
CA CO DE GA ID ** NC** ND SC SD
* Statutes/rules require testing by an independent testing authority (ITA) or NASED accredited laboratory
according to standards adopted by the FEC or EAC.
**Statute allows for NASED or EAC certification.
================================
Download Complete 50-State Report [1]
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
| State_Requirements_ &_Federal_Voting_Machine_Testing_Certification_EAC_Oct2007.pdf [1] | 4.29 MB |
by Bob Fitrakis and Harvey Wasserman Sept. 11, 2007 Ohio Republicans have blocked a proposal to test electronic voting machines prior to the 2008 presidential primary By a 4-3 vote, Republicans on Ohio's State Controlling Board blocked Democratic Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner's proposed $1.8 million unbid contract for voting machine testing. Brunner had already set aside the $1.8 million for the test. Her specific request to the Controlling Board was a waiver for competitive bidding. Her office had hoped to complete all testing by November 30, 2007. A former judge, Brunner is successor to the infamous J. Kenneth Blackwell, who helped engineer the theft of Ohio's electoral votes for George W. Bush in 2004. Brunner won election as a reform candidate, vowing to guarantee the public access to the polls---and an accurate vote count---in 2008. In California, Democratic Secretary of State Debra Bowen recently completed an extensive testing of that state's electronic voting machines. She decertified many of them and is on course to rework how America's biggest state casts and counts its ballots. Brunner has not been quite so aggressive. When it was recently revealed that 56 of 88 Ohio counties illegally destroyed protected materials from the 2004 election, she showed little reaction. She has also stated publicly doubts that the irregularities that defined the Ohio vote that year could have affected the outcome or that the illegal destruction of more than 2000 ballots could have been intentional. But in attempting to carry out her promise to test Ohio's electronic voting machines, Brunner has followed through on public demands that the ability of Ohio's electronic machines to deliver a fair and reliable vote count be proven. Tests and studies conducted by the federal Government Accountability Office, Princeton University, Johns Hopkins, the Brennan Center, the Carter-Baker Election Commission, John Conyer's House Judiciary Committee and others have all shown clearly that electronic voting machines are unreliable and easily rigged. The New York Times has now joined that consensus, calling for an outright federal ban. "Electronic voting has been an abysmal failure," the Times said. "Computer experts have done study after study showing that electronic voting machines, which are often shoddily made, can easily be hacked. With little effort, vote totals can be changed and elections stolen." MORE . . .Why doesn't the GOP want Ohio's voting machines tested?
http://www.smirkingchimp.com/thread/9848 [236]
Brunner's Plan to Retest Voting Machines has Skeptics
BY MARK NIQUETTE
The Columbus Dispatch
Sunday, September 9, 2007
Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner wants to spend more than $1.8 million to retest the state's voting machines, but some members of the Ohio Controlling Board aren't convinced it's necessary.
"I don't understand why we're doing it," said Sen. John Carey, R-Wellston, a member of the board, which is scheduled to consider Brunner's request Monday afternoon.
"I have real concerns about that particular request," said Sen. Steve Stivers, a Columbus Republican.
Brunner wants all of the electronic touch-screen and optical-scan systems used in Ohio and the procedures for handling them thoroughly examined to allay concerns about their security and accuracy.
MORE. . .
http://www.columbusdispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2007/09/09/brunner.html [237]
Originally published at Huffington Post
Posted September 10, 2007
Read More: Arianna Huffington , Breaking Off The Bus News
The following piece was produced through OffTheBus, a citizen journalism project hosted at the Huffington Post and launched in partnership with NewAssignment.Net. For more information, read Arianna Huffington's project introduction. If you'd like to join our blogging team, sign up here If you're interested in other opportunities, you can see the list here.
This is the first installment of a two-part report by Kirsten Anderson.
Which of the following best describes taking the SAT and voting?
A. They both take about four hours to complete.
B. They both require a thorough knowledge of a specific issue.
C. Their results are affected by the number of people participating.
D. Their results are affected by the weather.
Did you choose D? Here's why you should have: on August 24th, the College Board and NCS Pearson announced a tentative settlement of a class-action suit brought by about four thousand students whose October 2005 SATs were scored incorrectly. The College Board maintains and administers the SAT. Pearson NCS scores the tests.
In announcing the settlement, the College Board also described new quality control measures that have been put into place to reduce the likelihood of similar errors: all answer sheets will be scanned twice from now on, using different machines each time.
Tests will be kept in low humidity areas because high moisture had apparently contributed to the faulty reading of answers as the tests were scored by optical scanners (refresher to those of you haven't taken a standardized test for a while: you fill in the answer bubble on a test sheet, shading it as dark as you can. The answer sheet is fed into an optical scanner which records your answers and stores the results).
So what does this have to do with voting? NCS Pearson sells its own line of optical scan test-scoring machines, but one of the models sold under the Pearson name is made by Chatsworth Data Corporation (CDC). Another CDC client that sells a line of optical scanners under its own name is Election Systems & Software. ES&S is one of the primary suppliers of optical scanners used for voting in elections.
Now it's probably not likely that states holding primaries on February 5th, 2008, will be afflicted with bouts of humidity high enough to stretch out the ballots running through the scanners, causing the votes on them to be incorrectly counted. But it's not impossible either.
It's been a great summer for fans of voting technology follies.
On August 3rd, California Secretary of State, Debra Bowen announced that the state was decertifying a number of DRE (direct-recording electronic) voting machines after a two-month review revealed a number of security flaws in machines made by major voting systems players Diebold and Sequoia, as well as smaller company Hart Intercivic. In addition, another group of machines was disqualified after it was revealed that the company, ES&S, sold them in California before those models were certified by the state. ES&S faces an investigation on this matter and up to $10,000 in fines per uncertified machine. Meanwhile, counties all over California are scrambling to replace the machines they no longer can use.
Florida came close to facing its own decertification nightmare. A study by Florida State University researchers revealed security flaws in a model of Diebold optical scanners that were set to be used in upcoming elections. The state threatened to decertify the machines if a solution was not presented by August 17th, allowing time to get them ready for local elections in Sarasota County. In a letter to Diebold dated August 10th, Florida Secretary of State Kurt Browning stated that the problems had been resolved and the machines were certified for use.
An August 20th report from CNET.com described how the secret ballot in Ohio isn't so secret. A state open records law gives people the right to go to an election office and ask to look at a list of voter sign-ins and a list of votes cast--a list which is time-stamped. Putting the lists together could allow someone to make a reasonable match of voter in order of sign-in with the time-stamped vote.
The maker of the machine that includes the time-stamp, ES&S, protested that variables in the time it takes to vote could throw the list out of order. That may be true in a major election where there is a large turnout and there are many questions and candidates on a ballot. However, in a small local election, where voters may come in at slower pace, the lists probably agree quite easily and it is in this situation that being able to identify voters is more problematic. With a ballot of questions of importance to neighbors, colleagues and friends, finding out who voted how could lead to political or economic punishment or reward.
In addition to this problem, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunning is reviewing all models of voting machines used in Ohio. Some of the models they are investigating are Diebold machines that were decertified in California. Kentucky also recently discovered that its largest county has been using uncertified Diebold machines. In Colorado, Jefferson County is reconsidering their choice of machine.
And remember--the presidential primaries are about five months away.
The way votes are cast and counted has been in flux since the rocky 2000 presidential election. In October, 2002, the enthusiastically named Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was passed. The intent of HAVA, as described in the opening paragraph, was:
"To establish a program to provide funds to States to replace punch card voting systems, to establish the Election Assistance Commission to assist in the administration of Federal Elections and to otherwise provide assistance with the administration of certain Federal election laws and programs, to establish minimum election administration standards for States and units of local government with responsibility for the administration of Federal elections, and for other purposes."
HAVA also stated that new voting systems should allow voters the opportunity to check their vote before it is cast and counted; that there should be a paper trail for audit purposes; that machines should be accessible to people with disabilities; and that alternative language choices should be available.
In order to help states change their voting systems, HAVA authorized an amount in excess of three billion dollars distributing funds in amounts based on voting age population per state. States quickly began spending this money in order to get in compliance with HAVA. Three companies--Diebold, ES&S, and Sequoia--took advantage of the new electronic voting machine gold rush, jumping into the lead and dominating the nation's purchases of new election equipment.
The Election Assistance Commission was formed to help oversee HAVA. One of its jobs is implementation and funding of a system to federally certify voting machines; previously, there was a volunteer system for federal certification, overseen by the National Association of State Election Directors, a nonpartisan group that was not federally funded. As described by the Maryland State board of elections the NASED approved independent testing authorities (ITAs) and the ITAs tested voting systems. The ITA that tested a given system, though, was chosen and paid by the system manufacturer. This, of course, leads to questions of conflict-of-interest and reliability; one of these ITAs, Ciber Inc., which tested a large number of the systems in use throughout the country was shut down earlier this year due to questions of quality control and failure to complete all required tests.
States are not required by the EAC to participate in its own new federal lab certification program. However, most states demand federal certification in addition to state certification and are therefore likely to use it. Unfortunately, the EAC's first group of labs was not accredited until February, 2007. This means that the various new voting systems sold since 2002 have been certified under a patchwork, questionable system. The results have been predictably wild.
TrueVoteMD, a non-partisan organization, sent trained observers to precincts all over Maryland to watch voting in the elections on November 2, 2004. They reported a variety of problems that resulted in lost or incorrect votes. There were memory card failures and hard drive crashes. Touch screens were so sensitive that people complained they couldn't tell who they had voted for. Review screens went blank before they could check their votes. Ballots were submitted before the voter had made any choices. Polling places opened late because of trouble booting up machines, and votes were lost because people could not wait. Inadequate staffing meant voters weren't able to get help when they needed it.
VotersUnite!, a national election watch group collected information about voting problems in the November, 2006, mid-term elections. Difficulties with starting machines again contributed to precincts opening late. Voters saw machines register different candidates than those they had selected; staffers told them it was their fault for not knowing how to use a computer. At the end of the day, tallying the votes became a nightmare. Election workers reported machines adding votes multiple times; subtracting votes instead of adding them; and reporting a tally greater than the number of people who had voted. Some had trouble retrieving any information from the memory cards. Others got different sets of results every time they tried to get a total. One frustrated worker in North Carolina said that when they called the ES&S home office to get help with their machine, the phone was off the hook.
Most notably that year, in Sarasota, Florida, it was discovered that 18,000 people who had cast votes on other ballot questions had not marked a vote for the race for the District 13 Congressional Seat. The 13% "undervote" is considered an astonishing anomaly. According to a report on the incident by Common Cause, nearby Manatee County experienced only a two percent undervote, and a typical presidential election usually registers an undervote of less than one percent.
Essentially 18,000 votes were missing, which is particularly meaningful in light of the fact that the winner, Vern Buchanan, beat his opponent, Christine Jennings, by only 369 votes. Lawsuits by Jennings and local voters led the state to investigate the election, but they determined the machines were not at fault. However, a report on the state investigation by electronic voting experts David Dill and Dan Wallach found that the state's investigation was conducted incomplete, and improperly conducted in an unrealistic setting.
Electronic voting systems were supposed to make elections more secure, more convenient, and easier for voters. Instead, the 2006 elections had shown that the new systems were just as trouble-plagued as the banished punch-card and lever machines. With presidential primaries on the horizon, the question of what makes electronic voting machines so insecure and how can they be fixed, has to be answered.
Three large private corporations provide the systems that count more than 90% of Americas votes. The corporations, through their board members, have serious economic and political conflicts of interest. The largest companies, Diebold, ES&S and Sequoia gained some start up capital from right-wing billionaires such as Howard Ahmanson, and also have employees with criminal records related to computer fraud.
From "Whoscounting.net" [315]
There are four Big Daddies in the manufacture of our Election equipment in America:
Diebold Election Systems, E.S.&S., Sequoia Voting Systems, and Triad.
Diebold and ES&S together count 80% of our electronic vote. ES&S is the number one with two-thirds of the vote counting software and the biggest supplier of touch screen machines. Sequoia - with one-third of the voting machines on the market - is usually regarded as number two. Or Diebold. Depends who you ask. There is cloaked secrecy surrounding ownership and details about the companies, but investigative research scraping the tip of the iceberg has discovered enough to set anyone’s hair on fire...
In December 2003, Ohio - of all places - conducted a comparative study of four electronic voting systems’ vendors. The figures were revealing; ES&S led the pack with a total of 17 general security risks found, but had the lowest number of “very high security risks”-- only one, and that was the feature that could add multiple votes to the final count without warning. Diebold and Sequoia tied for second worst, each with 15 reported general risks. Five of Diebold’s were rated “very high” and 3 of Sequoia’s. Ironically, Hart Intercivic, one of the lesser used systems, rated well with only 10 general risks, however 4 of those were identified as ”very high risk.”
You may be surprised to learn that there is currently NO Federal Agency that has regulatory authority or controls over the multi-billion dollar elections industry. There are NO government standards or restrictions on who can sell and service voting machines and voting systems. Virtually anybody with money and know-how can get into the business of counting our vote! This might help explain why we keep running into criminals, political candidates, defense contractors, and other odd bedfellows in the mix when we examine the rosters of our election companies.
They are privately owned companies, some by foreign nationals, with multi-million dollar contracts, haunted by the presence of convicted felons in high places, dummy front companies, even mob connections. Yes, the people involved in the Corporations counting our American vote could be cast members in any given episode of the Sopranos. Companies shuffling name changes, “shared” executives moving back and forth between them, sales representatives from New Jersey crime families bribing public officials, ex-felons writing computer code.... it’s anything but boring being in the electronic vote industry.
Republican Computer expert, IT Auditor Chuck Herrin proclaims, “I am by trade a professional white-hat Hacker.. .so I know how easily systems can be breached, especially by insiders. Roughly 80% of all computer crimes are perpetrated by insiders, so that’s the best place to look first. When the insiders also write the code and roll out the machines… there’s NO QUESTION that they have too much power and should not be trusted---whether they support my party or not. It’s called ‘segregation of duties’ and it’s vital for system integrity.”
[316]
It matters who is doing the counting. In the US, four major companies with ties to the Republican Party do the vast majority of the counting on trade secret software.
About ES&S [170]
Election Systems & Software, Inc. Company Profile - Yahoo! Finance [167]
ES&S - Products & Services
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/electronic_voting.html
[152]
ES&S - Products & Services: Automark
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/automark.html [155]
ESS Automark VVPB system [155]
ES&S - Products & Services
DecisionOne - Services, Telework Planning [157]
ES&S Role in Election 2004
ESS iVotronic Counted Votes Several Times [162]
Verified Voting: ES&S iVotronic [163]
Miami-Dade ESS Machines 2003 Report [164]
Hagel’s ethics filings pose disclosure issue [165]
Wichita Co. TX ESS screwups [94]
WISH-TV - Indianapolis, IN - Excerpts from Interview with Election Systems & Software (ES&S) Executive [169]
WISH-TV - Indianapolis, IN - Marion County Election Board Demands Answers from ES&S [171]
Company to pay for election problems | IndyStar.com [173]
This section is devoted to system documentation for Diebold/Premier voting machines with some generic exceptions that would be relevant to Diebold/Premier machines.
Examples of content to be uploaded and shared from this location via downloadable file links (see at base of article) include:
Operator manuals
State-certified use procedures
Voting system contracts
Election audit logs and incident reports
Private and state-commissioned external reviews of voting system performance and vulnerabilities
Vendor correspondence with state and local election officials
Relevant legal actions
Proposed legislation with a bearing on the vendor's election products and services
Vendor-specific news articles
A brief description of what each document is appears below and before the URL address listing.
1. PhD Students from Univ. of Conn. show how The Diebold AccuVote Optical Scan can be rigged undetectably
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
| UCON_seeA-tamperEVoting.pdf [323] | 1.21 MB |
This section is devoted to system documentation for Sequoia voting machines with some generic exceptions that would be relevant to Sequoia machines.
Examples of content to be uploaded and shared from this location via downloadable file links (see at base of article) include:
Operator manuals
State-certified use procedures
Voting system contracts
Election audit logs and incident reports
Private and state-commissioned external reviews of voting system performance and vulnerabilities
Vendor correspondence with state and local election officials
Relevant legal actions
Proposed legislation with a bearing on the vendor's election products and services
Vendor-specific news articles
This video is an interview with Debra Bowen where she says machines should never go home with workers. Posted 10-2-07.
This very short video from the CA NAACP Conference in Manhattan Beach on October 27th,2007 SOS Bowen repeats "no sleepovers" will be allowed.
QUICK DESCRIPTIONS:
1. The Redline document shows the CA SOS Decertification/Recertification Document revised in October 2007 w/changes
2. The Sequoia Appendices contain several hundred pages of specific requirements & procedures ROVs must follow-2007
3. Lowell Finley issues additional conditions including security bags for DREs dated 11-29-07
4. Required procedures for CA ROVs to follow to maintain certification of Sequoia Systems 8-31-07
5. Form to be completed and submitted to SOS on all DRE problems effective 2-5-08
6. SOS Bowen - "Recertification of the Sequoia System...will...be revisited...[if] conditions are not being met."
7. RivCo ROV reports only 15 of 720 DREs had ANY problems in 2/5/08 Presidential Primary Election
8. Sequoia AVC Edge DRE - 124 pg. operators manual from 2001 - much still applies today
9. EAC declares Sequoia used illegal double testing w/Systest & iBeta 11-20-07
10. HAVA Section 3.2.1 Error standards for all voting machines 1 in 500,000 - if not met - HAVA $$ in danger
11. RivCo ROV Letter of Denial of central count viewing and WinEDS server re 11/7/06 election
12. Desert Hot Springs Election -Denial of audit logs of 3-6-07 RivCo election
13. HAVA Implementation according to CACEO - CA Association of Clerks & Elections Officials -Scott Konopasek 4/05
14. Sequoia RivCo Contract - 2-7-06 - Amendment to original contract of 2000- sole sourced
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
| sequoia_redline.pdf [324] | 66.86 KB |
| Sequoia CA Procedures - Appendices Aug '07.pdf [325] | 4.37 MB |
| Sequoia MODIFIED procedures approval 11-29-07 incl security bags.pdf [326] | 19.49 KB |
| Sequoia CA Procedures - Ch 1-11 Ver2.01 8-31-07.pdf [327] | 1.68 MB |
| Sequoia procedures - incident_report.pdf [328] | 400.04 KB |
| SOS Clarification_of_Voting_System_Certification.pdf [329] | 114.34 KB |
| Voting System Report to SoS from RivCo ROV 3-4-08.pdf [330] | 666.15 KB |
| Seq_AVC-Edge_op-man.pdf [331] | 5.14 MB |
| Sequoia illegal double testing Systest & iBeta 11-20-07.pdf [332] | 2.08 MB |
| error-rates-HAVA.pdf [333] | 64.79 KB |
| Denial of central count viewing and WinEDS server.pdf [334] | 46.86 KB |
| Desert Hot Springs Election of 3-6-07 - ltr from Dunmore.pdf [335] | 144.36 KB |
| County Guide to implement HAVA.pdf [336] | 1.99 MB |
| 14- Sequoia RivCo Contract - 2-7-06.pdf [337] | 3.35 MB |
under construction
Election Defense Alliance is a program of International Humanities Center, a nonprofit organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the IRS Code.
Links:
[1] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/State_Requirements_ &_Federal_Voting_Machine_Testing_Certification_EAC_Oct2007.pdf
[2] http://www.verifiedvoting.org/verifier/
[3] http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part4/equipment_machines06.html
[4] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=5693
[5] http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce_report_4.htm#alt
[6] http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:Tf-4HSF5GWkJ:www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDITAProcess.pdf "Shawn Southworth"&hl=en<http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:Tf-4HSF5GWkJ:www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDITAProcess.pdf "Shawn Southworth"&hl=en>
[7] http://www.baltimorechronicle.com/080304LindaSchade.shtml
[8] http://www.accupoll.com/News/NewsReleases/releases/2005-05-11.html
[9] http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:Rsfe7m0t1jQJ:www.ss.ca.gov/elections/090904_1a_staff.pdf Avante "Vote Trakker"&hl=en&lr=lang_en
[10] http://www.google.com/search?as_q=&num=10&hl=en&c2coff=1&btnG=Google Search&as_epq=Vote Trakker&as_oq=Avante&as_eq=&lr=lang_en&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_qdr=all&as_occt=any&as_dt=i&as_sitesearch=&safe=off
[11] http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/accessible_optical_voting.html
[12] http://www.aitechnology.com/avantetech/home.html
[13] http://www.afb.org/aw/aw030603.asp
[14] http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/tally.html
[15] http://www.accupoll.com/
[16] http://www.accupoll.com/TheAccuPollAdvantage/
[17] http://www.accupoll.com/Products/
[18] http://www.accupoll.com/Products/Quote/
[19] http://www.accupoll.com/TheAccuPollAdvantage/WhitePapers/
[20] http://serform2.sos.state.oh.us/sos/news/index4.htm
[21] http://www.eac.gov/election_resources/vss.html
[22] http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/158/3362.html?1108508621
[23] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=5764
[24] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=77
[25] http://www.ncvoter.net/affordable.html
[26] http://www.google.com/search?as_q=&num=10&hl=en&c2coff=1&btnG=Google Search&as_epq=Election Systems Task Force &as_oq=Grumman Lockheed Accenture EDS&as_eq=&lr=lang_en&as_ft=i&as_filetype=&as_qdr=all&as_occt=any&as_dt=i&as_sitesearch=&as_rights=&safe=off
[27] http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/6.html
[28] http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Science_Applications_International_Corporation
[29] http://www.verifiedvoting.org/downloads/
[30] http://www.electiondataservices.com/EDSInc_VEStudy2006.pdf
[31] http://www.electiondataservices.com/EDSInc_DREoverview.pdf
[32] http://www.electiondataservices.com/Merchant2/merchant.mvc?Screen=PLST
[33] http://www.electiondataservices.com/content/datafiles.htm
[34] http://www.epic.org/privacy/voting/foia/default.html#news
[35] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=37
[36] http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?list=type&type=63
[37] http://www.notablesoftware.com/Papers/CACM1102.html
[38] http://www.futurenet.org/article.asp?id=619
[39] http://www.bradblog.com/archives/00001940.htm
[40] http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=A_Short_but_Tragic_History_of_E-voting_Public_Relations
[41] http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=E-Voting:_Digital_Democracy_or_a_Cash_Cow_for_Consultants?
[42] http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-02-05-election-glitches_x.htm
[43] http://www.votingindustry.com/TabulationVendors/Articles/history_of_voting_machines.htm
[44] http://www.votersunite.org/info/statesystems.asp
[45] http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachineErrors.htm
[46] http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?id=5133
[47] http://www.wired.com/news/evote/
[48] http://www.ecotalk.org/VotingMachineCompanies.htm
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[326] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia MODIFIED procedures approval 11-29-07 incl security bags.pdf
[327] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia CA Procedures - Ch 1-11 Ver2.01 8-31-07.pdf
[328] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia procedures - incident_report.pdf
[329] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/SOS Clarification_of_Voting_System_Certification.pdf
[330] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Voting System Report to SoS from RivCo ROV 3-4-08.pdf
[331] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Seq_AVC-Edge_op-man.pdf
[332] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Sequoia illegal double testing Systest & iBeta 11-20-07.pdf
[333] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/error-rates-HAVA.pdf
[334] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Denial of central count viewing and WinEDS server.pdf
[335] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/Desert Hot Springs Election of 3-6-07 - ltr from Dunmore.pdf
[336] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/County Guide to implement HAVA.pdf
[337] http://electiondefensealliance.org/files/14- Sequoia RivCo Contract - 2-7-06.pdf