Virus in the Voting Machines: Tainted Results in NY-23

Source: Gouverneurtimes.com


Virus in the Voting Machines: Tainted Results in NY-23

Northern NY News
Written by Nathan Barker  
Thursday, 19 November 2009 12:44

GOUVERNEUR, NY - The computerized voting machines used by many voters in the 23rd district had a computer virus - tainting the results, not just from those machines known to have been infected, but casting doubt on the accuracy of counts retrieved from any of the machines.

Cathleen Rogers, the Democratic Elections Commissioner in Hamilton County stated that they discovered a problem with their voting machines the week prior to the election and that the "virus" was fixed by a Technical Support representative from Dominion, the manufacturer.  The Dominion/Sequoia Voting Systems representative "reprogrammed" their machines in time for them to use in the Nov. 3rd Special Election. None of the machines (from the same manufacturer) used in the other counties within the 23rd district were looked at nor were they recertified after the "reprogramming" that occurred in Hamilton County.
ImageCast Scanner
ImageCast Scanner
Republican Commissioner Judith Peck refused to speculate on whether the code that governs the counts could have been tampered with.  She indicated that "as far as I know, the machine in question was not functioning properly and was repaired" by the technician.
 
Commissioners in other counties have stated that they were not made aware of the virus issue in Hamilton County.  In Jefferson County, inspectors from four districts claim that "human error" resulted in their "mistakenly" entering 0 votes for Hoffman in several districts, resulting in Owens leading Jefferson County on election night though the recanvas of the computer counts now show that Hoffman is leading.  Jefferson County has not conducted a manual paper ballot recount. 

_________________________________________

'Whether the erroneous results are computer error, or tampering,
significant doubt now exists with regard to the accuracy of the vote counts from November 3rd . . . A manual paper-ballot recount of the vote could resolve computer vote accuracy questions.'

_________________________________________

 
 

In St. Lawrence County, machines in Louisville, Waddington, Claire, and Rossie "broke" early in the voting process on election day.  Republican Commissioner Deborah Pahler said that the machines kept "freezing up... like Windows does all the time," and that they experienced several paper jams as well.  The voted ballots that could not be scanned were placed in an Emergency Lock Box and re-scanned later at the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections.  Election officials in St. Lawrence County were given no advance knowledge of a potential virus in the system.

At least one County official thus far has raised concern that it's possible that ALL of the machines used in the NY-23 election had the 'virus' but only a few malfunctioned as a result.  The counts from any district that used the ImageCast machines are suspect due to "the virus" discovered in Hamilton County, last-minute "reprogramming" by Dominion workers, and security flaws in the systems themselves.  A manual paper-ballot recount of the vote could resolve computer vote accuracy questions.

Frank Hoar, an attorney for the Democratic Party, initially ordered the impound of malfunctioning machines but released the order on Nov. 5th so that Bill Owens could be sworn in to Congress in time to vote on the House Health bill on November 7th.  Pahler said that once the impound order was released they opened the locked ballot box and had the ballots scanned.  Pahler also stated that after they were able to get data from the malfunctioning machines, they did a hand-count of the ballots as well to ensure that the counts matched.  Even though not required to, both commissioners in St. Lawrence County agreed that the manual count was necessary due to the malfunctions

The machines themselves are languishing at the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections until after the election results have been certified to the state on November 28th, 2009.  Pahler indicated that they have not yet been able to examine the machines to determine why they malfunctioned.  A qualified technician would be able to verify the presence of a virus in the computers, but, other than the infected machines, no security precautions were taken to ensure chain of custody on the remaining computerized voting machines utilized in the 23rd district.
 

Impossible Numbers in NY-23

Source: Gouverneurtimes.com

cartton, impossible numbersThis article was based upon unofficial results provided to the author by the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections in a .pdf file on the same day that the election results were certified.  These were not the certified results, and the author deeply regrets having said that they were.

Five days after the publication of this article, the Board of Elections provided an .xls spreadsheet of the certified results, district by district, in which only the numbers for ballots cast and blank ballots had been changed; and a .pdf file, dated Monday, November 30th, with numbers for blank ballots inserted, district by district.  The changes in the numbers for ballots cast are duly noted in this revised article.

The Board of Elections has stated that only the numbers for “blank ballots” were computer generated in the original .pdf file, and that the “whole number” of ballots cast for each election district was entered manually.  The data entry program then automatically subtracted the vote counts for each of the candidates and the remainder would appear in the final column as “blank ballots.”  In these six election districts (and perhaps others), data entry errors were made in the first column, for “whole number” of ballots cast, which resulted in the erroneous numbers in the final column, for “blank ballots."


Impossible Numbers in NY-23

Northern NY News
by Richard Hayes Phillips, Ph.D.  
Wednesday, 25 November 2009

CANTON, NY – The election results certified by the St. Lawrence County Board of Elections for New York’s 23rd Congressional District did not contain the mathematically impossible numbers reported here last week.  Those were not the certified results, and the author deeply regrets having said that they were.

For six election districts in St. Lawrence County (the 2nd, 4th, 6th and 7th districts in Canton, the 14th district in Massena, and the 2nd district in Oswegatchie) negative numbers had appeared in the unofficial results, in the column for “blank” ballots, known in other states as “undervotes.”

Blank vote counts are ballots in which the voter did not choose any candidate in a given election and are determined by subtracting the total number of votes cast for the candidates from the number of voters who completed ballots.  The remaining number would be those voters who didn’t cast a vote for that election.

In Canton’s 7th district, the unofficial results showed a total of 148 ballots cast. The results of those votes were counted as 88 votes for Owens, 11 votes for Scozzafava, and 80 votes for Hoffman.  The problem was that these numbers add up to 179 votes counted for the candidates, and the unofficial results reported only 148 ballots cast; so the number of ‘blank’ ballots appeared as -31.

Election analysts refer to this phenomenon as “phantom voters,” because they are apparitions.  They do not actually exist.  There can never be more votes counted for any office than the number of actual voters who cast ballots.  There could be one or two, if on occasion an actual voter forgot to sign the poll book, but never 31.
_____________________________________
“Phantom votes” can be introduced into the system.
The computer can be programmed to add votes to one candidate’s total,
and the unsuspecting Board of Elections
will dutifully subtract all the candidates’ vote counts from the total ballots cast,
report the remainder as “blank votes,” all the numbers will add up perfectly,
and no one will be the wiser –
except, of course, if negative numbers turn up in the column for “blank votes.”
_____________________________________
 
In addition to the 31 “phantom votes” in Canton's 7th district, there were 16 more in Canton’s 2nd district, two in Canton's 4th district, 20 in the 7th, 22 in Massena 14th district, and 2 in Oswegatchie 2nd district.

A “phantom vote,” which is a vote counted with no ballot cast, is the opposite of a “blank vote” or “undervote,” which is a ballot cast with no vote counted.  They cancel each other out.  Thus, if “phantom votes” are allowed into a vote counting system, they can be masked if there are fewer of them than the number of “blank votes” or “undervotes.”

Meeting to Preserve NY Lever Voting, Manhattan, July 9

Thu, 07/09/2009 7:30pm - 9:30pm
DEFENDERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO VOTE GO HEAD-TO-HEAD
WITH STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS COMMISSIONER


July 9, 2009   7:30 PM
10th Street and 2nd Ave in Manhattan

The Threat to Voting in New York and What to Do About It:
Why lever machines are safe to vote on (and affordable) and optical scanners are neither


Douglas Kellner, Commissioner of NYS Board of Elections
Mark Crispin Miller, renowned author of "Fooled Again, The Real Case for Electoral Reform"
Andi Novick, attorney, driving force behind efforts to preserve New York's constitutionally-compliant lever voting system

Main Sanctuary at St. Marks Church in the Bowery
10th Street and 2nd Ave in Manhattan
sponsored by the Village Independent Democrats -- all invited, free
(212 741- 2994)

New York State is the only left in the U.S. that stills has a transparent and verifiable method of voting. All other states have moved to electronic vote-counting systems that make it impossible for election officials, official observers, candidates, or the public to determine whether the announced vote totals accurately represent the votes cast.

These secret vote-counting systems violate the principles of a constitutional democracy as represented in two centuries of statutory law and judicial precedence interpreting New York’s Constitution, and as recently held by Germany’s Constitutional Court. Yet electronic voting systems are slated to be fully operational in New York by 2010.

At this free public event, Andi Novick will outline the reasons New York's Election Reform and Modernization Act (ERMA) is unconstitutional, Mark Crispin Miller will discuss the dangers of electronic vote counting systems, and Douglas Kellner will explain the state's insistence on an expensive change in election technology beyond what is required by the federal government.

Please Donate and Sign our Petition:

NY Sequoia "ImageCast" Machines Have 50% Failure Rate

Original source: http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/07/ny-50-percent-o.html

NY: 50 Percent of Sequoia Voting Machines Flawed

By Kim Zetter | Threat Level | Wired Magazine | July 14, 2008

New York state is in the process of replacing its lever voting machines with new voting equipment, but the state revealed recently that it has found problems with 50 percent of the roughly 1,500 ImageCast optical-scan machines (shown in the video above) that Sequoia Voting Systems has delivered to the state so far -- machines that are slated to be used by dozens of counties in the state's September 9 primary and November 4 presidential election.

Douglas Kellner, co-chair of the New York State Board of Elections, expressed frustration with the vendor, saying it appeared that Sequoia was using the state's acceptance testing process to find problems with its machines in lieu of a sound quality-control process.

"There's no way the vendor could be adequately reviewing the machines and having so many problems," he told Threat Level. "What it tells us is that the vendor just throws this stuff over the transom and does not do any alpha- or beta-testing of their own before they apply for certification testing. Then they expect that we'll identify technical glitches and then they'll correct those glitches. But correction of those glitches is an extraordinarily time-consuming process. And its very disappointing that this equipment is not ready for prime time."

One main problem with the machines has been the printers. The ImageCast machines are special optical-scan machines that include an LCD screen, a printer and a ballot-marking device that allows disabled voters to use them. Disabled voters view the ballot on screen or hear it read to them through headphones, then make their selection using special attachments (a device with buttons or a sipping straw), after which the machine prints out a paper ballot that gets read by the optical scanner component.

Multiple Operational Flaws Render Machines 'Unusable'

The printer, Kellner noted, is a core component of the machine. But they malfunction "if you don't feed the paper exactly right or if the buttons aren't pushed just right," he said. They also have trouble handling write-in candidates. If a voter's writing exceeds a certain width, Kellner said the printer shuts down without indicating why it's shutting down. "These are serious glitches that should have been picked up in the vendor's own quality-control process," he said.

But Sequoia isn't the only problem, according to counties who have reported receiving problematic machines from the state Board of Elections after the board was supposed to have tested and certified the machines. The Board of Elections is examining all of the new machines before sending them out to counties.

In Nassau County alone, the largest voting district outside of New York City, officials found problems with 85 percent of the 240 ImageCast machines it received so far -- problems that the county characterized in a letter as "substantial operational flaws that render them unusable or that require major repairs."

The problems include printers jamming, broken monitors and wheels, machines that wouldn't boot up, and misaligned printer covers that prevented the covers from closing completely, creating security concerns. The county rejected 48 machines right at delivery, due to physical damage. Another 58 machines exhibited problems during testing, according to William Biamonte, the Democratic elections commissioner for Nassau County. [New York counties have two election directors -- one each from the Democratic and Republican parties -- to avoid charges of unfair elections.]

Some of the latter machines, he said, shook dramatically when they were running and workers either had to shut them down or the machines shut themselves down from the vibration. Other machines had dead batteries or batteries that wouldn't hold a two-hour charge, as they were required to do.

Another 112 machines produced a "printer failure" error message. Biamonte says this was the result of a change Sequoia made to its firmware. He said that when he received his first batch of machines about a month ago, the machines had "horrific paper jams." To fix the problem, Sequoia loaded new firmware on the systems to speed up the printer, but in doing so disabled the USB port on machines, resulting in the "printer failure" error messages.

Biamonte, who blames the Board of Elections in part for not noticing the problems before forwarding the machines to counties, said a state worker told him he should instruct election workers to just ignore the error message. "How is that acceptable?" Biamonte asked.

"Say you buy a brand new car and it works good but the oil gauge isn't working. They tell you, Just drive it anyway. These are brand new machines. $12,000 each. We cannot in confidence send (them) out to a polling place knowing they have this printer error. How do we know if we really do have a printer failure?"

Nassau County, which has nearly 900,000 registered voters, is slated to receive 450 machines total, but has refused delivery on the remaining machines and has asked a federal court to order Sequoia to repair the machines. It also requested a review of the state Board of Elections' acceptance and testing procedures. That review was completed Thursday by a quality-control firm hired by the Board of Elections.

The firm's report found that the Board of Elections' procedures for accepting and testing the machines were adequate, but acknowledged that some problems may have occurred due to a lack of communication between state election officials and county officials. [Read more info about this report after the jump.]

Biamonte, who respects Kellner and thinks he feels as frustrated by Sequoia as he does, nonetheless called the report "ridiculous" and "disingenuous," saying that cracked screens and jammed printers weren't the result of communication problems.

The ImageCast machines are not actually made by Sequoia but by a Canadian subcontractor named Dominion, which is based in Toronto, and a sub-subcontractor named Jaco Electronics, based in New York. A press release on Sequoia's site noted that Jaco won the contract to produce 4,500 optical-scan machines for Sequoia/Dominion only in April of this year and needed to add 40 to 50 people to its workforce to fulfill the contract.

Nassau County began receiving its machines from the state in June, which suggests that the machines may have been rushed through production too quickly. A Sequoia spokeswoman would say only that the company is working with state officials "to identify and resolve any voting equipment concerns they may have."

The Sequoia ImageCast machines were designed exclusively for New York and are not currently being used in any other state. The machines have not yet been federally certified, though Kellner says Sequoia assured the state last January that federal testing and certification would be completed on the system by April or May, before the state began its own testing and certification of the equipment.

New York Under Federal Justice Department Order

New York doesn't have a choice about using the machines this year. The state was sued by the Department of Justice for failing to meet a federal deadline for having accessible voting machines in place. The Help America Vote Act passed in 2002 requires every voting precinct to provide at least one accessible voting machine for disabled voters by 2006. New York is just now getting the machines in place.

Because the ImageCast machines are still undergoing certification testing by the state, only the ballot marking device -- and not the scanning portion of the machine -- will be used in New York this year. The counties will continue to use lever machines for non-disabled voters until 2009. The printed paper ballots produced by the ballot-marking portion of the machine will be read by hand, rather than scanned.

Broken Security Seals

One interesting tidbit turned up in the quality-control report that examined the state board of elections acceptance and testing process. The report reveals that a voting machine vendor is the first to examine the machines when they arrive to the state's voting machine warehouse from the manufacturer. The vendor representative is supposed to examine the machines for missing or damaged parts. Once the vendor representative has signed off on the equipment, it goes to temporary workers that the state has hired to test the machines. Biamonte says the temp workers are college students, who work under the supervision of board of election employees.

After the testing is completed, a tamper-evident seal is placed on the machines and they're passed back to the vendor representative who is responsible for shipping off the machines to counties. This creates chain-of-custody concerns that Biamonte says are exacerbated by the fact that when he received his machines in Nassau County, a number of the tamper-evident seals on them were cracked. "How do we know this wasn't tampered with?" he said

Volunteer to Save New York's Lever Voting System


Volunteer to help keep NY's voting systems constitutional! Everything you do and learn on this project will be applicable to other, similar projects. That's why we encourage you to join a Working Group that matches your interests, so you can team up with others interested in the same skills and subjects. Learn and work together to build up EI movement's capacity to carry out effective campaigns.
Contact Joanne Lukacher at [email protected] to get involved.

How You Can Help

Newshounds - Comb the press for articles on New York's election technology, then post comments and contact the reporters. 

Bloggers - Reach hundreds of New York readers with your commentaries on the case and critiques of mainstream coverage. 

Fundraisers - We only need a half a million dollars to pursue this; totally doable.

Board of Election Monitors - Obtain weekly feedback on how the ballot marking devices are fairing, personnel and training issues, costs, etc. Our county election commissioners need support.

Local Liaisons - Contact local political committees (Dems, Repubs, Greens, Libertarians) and civic organizations (advocacy groups, churches, clubs, unions). Voting matters to everyone!

Teachers/Professors - This is the ultimate civics lesson, defending voting rights guaranteed in the New York constitution. Bring your students to witness.

Court Gallery - Attend court hearings so the judge and newsmedia can see the public's commitment to election transparency.

Pro Bono Attorneys - This is a trailblazing lawsuit and we'll need devoted legal talent to prevail.

Videographers - Document this story as New York sets precedent for the nation, reaffirming the right to vote as the civil right that protects all others.

Save New York's Lever Voting System

Prevent Secret Vote Counting on Theft-Enabling Computers From Becoming A Reality in New York

Tell the New York state judiciary to uphold our constitutional right to a transparent, secure, theft-deterring electoral system. New York voters do not consent to voting on undetectably mutable, software-driven voting machines.

Contribute to the Election Transparency Coalition legal fund

Want to do more?  Volunteer! Click here

To learn more go to Election Transparency Coalition blog.

See what you can do to prevent our birthright from being stolen.


LibertyVote Still Suing to Force DREs on NY State

From Bo Lipari's blog, 3/22/08:

http://www.nyvv.org/boblog/2008/03/22/the-law-litigation-and-libertyvote/

Vendor to sue NY again to allow DREs

I told you the DRE vendors are like zombies, and will never, ever stop trying to force DRE machines on New York State voters. Once again, LibertyVote and their Dutch partner Nedap are preparing to go to Court to challenge county purchases for accessible paper ballot systems, and to overturn New York State’s right to test our voting machines to the strict standards we worked so hard to achieve.

On Thursday, March 20, the Cattaraugus county Board of Elections informed the State Board that they wanted to change the order placed last month for 57 Ballot Marking Devices, and instead want to substitute LibertyVote DREs for the paper ballot systems. This is an astonishing request for several reasons – for one, orders have already been placed for the ballot markers and contracts have been completed, signed and sealed; and for another, the LibertyVote DRE has yet to undergo any testing whatsoever! Yes, that’s right, testing to New York’s rigorous standards has not yet even started, and won’t be completed until this summer at the earliest. But Cattaraugus county is telling the State Board they want to purchase the LibertyVote DRE now, essentially asking them to bypass all testing and simply approve the machine at the next Board meeting on Wednesday, March 26.

The Cattaraugus letter, signed by the county commissioners (and obviously prepared by LibertyVote/Nedap’s lawyers) lays out the vendor’s litigation strategy and arguments to the Court if the State Board refuses the county request to allow them to switch from paper ballots to an uncertified DRE. My guess - if the State Board turns down this outrageous request at the next meeting, LibertyVote/Nedap will be back in State Supreme Court before the close of business asking that New York’s certification testing be canceled and their DRE immediately approved for purchase. And based on their past success in this Court, why wouldn’t they?

But will the 4 Commissioners stand up to the DRE vendor? I certainly hope so, for granting the county’s request would fly in the face of everything the Board has said during the last three years about New York’s rigorous certification process and standards, and would essentially cancel New York’s voting machine certification testing. But there’s cause for concern that the Board may not stand their ground. As I reported in my last post, the Board demonstrated that LibertyVote/Nedap’s legal assaults on New York’s machine selection process have made them reluctant to deny approval to the vendor’s machines, even in light of evidence that they do not meet state requirements.

Let me be clear – if the State Board approves the Cattaraugus request at their meeting, they will violate the letter and the spirit of New York’s election laws and regulations which promise voters a comprehensive and complete testing regimen. If the Board approves this request, they will be enablers for a voting machine vendor that has demonstrated when they can’t win approval on merit, they are willing to force approval by litigation; a vendor that believes that the voices of voters, legislators, and election officials around New York State are but a minor annoyance that can be ignored at their choosing; ultimately, a vendor that believes that their right to profit supersedes the requirements of the law, the voters, and democracy.

Alternatives to Forced E-Voting Proposed in US Justice v. NY State HAVA Suit

Click here for 12.15.07 Press Release on Amicus Brief Click Here to Download the Amicus Brief

Scroll down for links to all amici declarations and exhibits filed in this case.

United States v. New York State Board of Elections

No. 06-CV-0262, U.S. District Court, Northern District of New York

. • Complaint:
This lawsuit, filed March 1, 2006, seeks declaratory and injunctive relief for the Defendants’ alleged failure to implement the voting system standards and statewide voter list provisions of HAVA. With respect to the voting system standards, the complaint supports its allegation by noting that the State Board failed to (1) approve any voting systems, (2) adopt any final rules or regulations related to voting systems, and (3) obtain any voting systems that comply with the requirements of HAVA.

With respect to statewide voter list, the complaint notes that, among other things, the has failed to (1) publish any rules or regulations governing the statewide voter list, (2) take the necessary steps to contract for the development of a statewide voter database, and (3) establish the necessary agreements with the Social Security Administration to match voter registration information.

• Status:
The U.S. Justice Department sought a preliminary injunction on March 6, which was granted by the court on 23, 2006. The court ordered the State Board of Elections to file a remedial HAVA implementation plan by April 10, 2006, and provided ten days to respond, later extended to eighteen days. State filed its HAVA plan with court on April 10, and Plaintiffs’ responded on April 18th agreeing to the plan. On June 2, the court ruled that the Board’s HAVA plan would bring the state, over time, into full compliance and set a series of deadlines for implementation and reporting. Currently before the court is a motion to intervene by a diverse coalition of civic organizations that is concerned about the adequacy of the state’s plan.

• Parties: This lawsuit was filed by the Voting Section of the Department of Justice against the New York State Board of Elections, its co-executive directors, and the State of York.


All amici declarations filed in this case are available for download from the links you see immediately below this text window.

New York Voter Registration Information

New York Voter Registration Database Report:

State Regulations and Procedures Implementing HAVA Voter Registration Requirements

Attached is the New York Voter Registration Information as set forth in Making the List, Database Matching and Verification Processes for Voter Registration as published by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University on March 24, 2006. This document contains available information about voter regtistration current as of the date of publication.

Federal law now requires, as of January 1, 2006, that states create and maintain statewide databases to serve as the central source of voter registration information. Citizens’ ability to get on the rolls (and thus their ability to vote and have their votes counted) will now depend on the policies and procedures governing the use of these databases in the voter registration process.

Evidence demonstrates that poor policy and procedure choices could result in the unwarranted disenfranchisement of millions of eligible citizens attempting to register to vote. The new statewide databases, and their role in the voter registration process, are poorly understood, but extremely consequential.

The Making the List report, issued just as the state databases begin to come online, presents the first comprehensive catalog of the widely varying state database practices governing how (and in some cases, whether) individuals seeking to register will be placed on the voter rolls.

The report covers the state’s voter registration process, from the application form up through Election Day -- including the intake of registration forms, the manner in which information from the forms may be matched to other government lists, the consequences of the match process, and any opportunity to correct errors. Each variation at each step of the process has tangible consequences for voters seeking to register and vote in 2006 and beyond.

IMPORTANT:
Because of the possibility that voter information may differ from database to database (abbreviations, street designations, etc.) or because of data entry errors, valid voter registration data may be rejected.

Individual voters are urged to contact their county clerk or local election board to determine that they are properly registered. Many such election authorities maintain online services for this purpose, but others will require a telephone call or perhaps a written inquiry to determine the voter's eligibility.

As an addendum to this state report, a fill-in form for voter registration is presented which can be completed, printed, and sent to the appropriate registratrar of voters (generally the county Clerk or local election board). The proper form of submission and location is included on the registration form

New York

Looking for Voter Registration Information for Your State?

Project Vote Smart has prepared an excellent guide to voter registration rules, deadlines, and procedures in all 50 states.

Click the link below, then select your state from the dropdown list:
http://www.votesmart.org/voter_registration_resources.php

Also check the [Your State] Voter Registration Information link below to read a detailed profile of your state's voter registration database and state-specific voter registration policies.

The report is part of the 50-state national survey titled Making the List, researched by the Brennan Center for Justice.

Additionally, we recommend getting and sharing a copy of the book Count My Vote!, a voters' self-defense guide to voter registration, election regulations, and voter ID laws in all 50 states.

By arrangement with publisher AlterNet, EDA is offering these handbooks at a 40% discount, just $6.00 plus postage.

Available here: Count My Vote Please inform voter registration and election protection organizations about this important guide.

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